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RETAINING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY ON THE DOMINION OF JUDGES
Larry Catd Backer*

Why do the people and institutionsof democratic states,and in particularthose
of the UnitedStates, obeyjudges? This articleexamines thefoundationsofjudicial
authority in the United States. This authority is grounded on principles of
dominance derivedfrom the organization of institutionalreligion. The judge in
Western states asserts authorityon the same basis as the priest - but not the priest
as conventionallyunderstood.Rather, the authorityof the judge in modern Western
democraticstates is better understood when viewed through the analytical lens of
priestlyfunction developed in the philosophy of FriedrichNietzsche. Focusing on
the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, this paper
examines the manner in which high-courtjudges have successfully internalizedthe
characteristicsof Nietzsche's Pauland his priestly caste within the "religion" of
Western constitutionalism.
Paul wanted the end, consequently he also wanted the means. What he
himself did not believe, the idiots among whom he threw his doctrine
believed. His need was forpower; in Paulthe priestwantedpower once
again - he could use only concepts, doctrines, symbols with which one
tyrannizes masses andforms herds.'

This critique of systems, and especially of systems locating the power of
judgment, reward and punishment outside the self, is echoed in the recent
constitutional jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and the European
Court of Justice. This article examines American and European textualism as a
mechanism for the reinforcement ofjudicial authority. Judges acquire a monopoly
over communication with the "divine" -justice, truth, and norms - as expressed
* Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. The author
can be reached at lcbl 1@psu.edu. My thanks to the participants at the March 2001 meeting
of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities Conference, University
of Texas College of Liberal Arts, and the participants at the September 2001 meeting of the
British Critical Legal Conference, University of Kent at Canterbury (England) for their
comments and observations. Special thanks to my research assistant, Seema Lal ('03), for her
excellent work.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 565, 618 (Walter
Kaufmann ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1977) (1881-1892) [hereinafter The Antichrist].
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in constitutions, whether or not written. That expression provides the basis for the
regulation of sin, which is a deviation from the divine expression only the priest
knows. "[T]he priest rules through the invention of sin."2 The constitutional judge
rules through the inversion of doctrine. The interpretive doctrines, standards and
tests that have grown up around constitutionalism convert norms into a morass of
the unknowable, with only the guidance of priests speaking through courts. And so
the judge creates mechanics of authority based on self-reinforcing dependence.
[N]othing could be more obscure and out of reach of the common man
than a law founded on precedent.... A French lawyer is just a man of
learning, but an English or an American one is somewhat like the
Egyptian priests, being, as they were, the only interpreter of an occult
science.'
INTRODUCTION

The judiciary acquires supreme authority over matters of constitutional
interpretation in one of two ways. In many countries, judicial power is conferred by
the people, as ultimate sovereigns.4 The European Union, like other emerging supranational states, follows this model in constituting its European Court of Justice.5
2

Id. at 631.

3 ALEXIS DE TOQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267 (J.P. Mayer ed., George

Lawrence trans., 1969).
4 Judicial power of this sort is usually vested in a specialized "constitutional court." See,

e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through
Constitutionalization:Lessons From Four ConstitutionalRevolutions, 25 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 91 (2000) (noting how the increase of judicial power in Israel, Canada, New
Zealand, and South Africa resulted from constitutional changes authorized by constituents);
Walter F.Murphy, Constitutions,Constitutionalism,andDemocracy,in CONSTITuTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas Greenberg et al.
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (discussing how the people of some Western nations cede
their sovereign power to interpret law to constitutional courts); see generally MAURO
CAPPELLElTI, JUDICIAL REVIEw iN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971) (examining the
historical relationship between democratic will and judicial review by a judiciary that the
democratic will itself legitimizes).
The jurisdiction of these courts is usually limited to issues of constitutional
interpretation. Many of these courts have no authority over any underlying litigation from
which constitutional issues may have arisen. However, these courts often have power to issue
binding advisory opinions. See Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in
CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND RIGHTs 38,41 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., Columbia
Univ. Press 1990).
5 See, e.g., ANTHONY ARNUIL, THEEUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OFJUSTICE 21-74
(1999); RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL

INTEGRATION 16-35 (St. Martin's Press 1998) (noting that the European Court of Justice
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In some nations, like the United States, the judiciary confers this power on itself.6
This self-conferral of authority has produced a slow, episodic, reluctant - but
nonetheless general acquiescence of the other political institutions of
7
government. Debates centering on reservations about the legitimacy ofajudicially
self-conferred supremacy "in the exposition of the law of the Constitution... as
a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system"' continue to
this day,9 even within the Supreme Court itself.'° This article will not contribute
derives its power by means of treaty); see generally L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY,
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1994) (describing how
international treaties give the Court specified powers of judicial review).
6 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (stating that Congress has
no constitutional authority to overturn a constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court
through legislation); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
' Marbury and its progeny generated a tremendous amount of formal and theoretical
opposition. Perhaps the greatest representative of this oppositionist school was John C.
Calhoun. See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, A Discourseon the Constitutionand Government of the
UnitedStates, in UNION AND LIBERTY: THEPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY OFJOHN C. CALHOUN 79,
186-87 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) (1850). The most extreme forms of rejectionism were
discredited with the defeat of the secessionist states in the American Civil War, but
prominent members of the federal government continue to echo this old rejectionism. See,
e.g., Edwin Meese III, Perspectiveon the Authoritativenessof Supreme CourtDecision:The
Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 982-83 (1987) (challenging the notion that
constitutional case law carries with it the same authoritative weight as the text of the
Constitution. Mr. Meese served as Attorney General of the United States during the
administration of Ronald Reagan).
8 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
9 Jack Wade Nowlin nicely summarized this well known history:
Of course, the question ofjudicial overreach is scarcely anew issue in American
politics. Indeed, the question of the proper judicial role dates back to the
founding, as well as to the early Republic and the clashes between Federalists
and Anti-Federalists, Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians. The role of the Supreme
Court was also controversial during the Jacksonian era, the years leading up to
the Civil War, and during Reconstruction. Moreover, democratic reform
movements championing the participatory rights of ordinary Americans have
made the elite judicial "usurpation" of democratic authority a regular part of our
political discourse since the turn of the last century, when the state and federal
courts first began to exercise the power of judicial review routinely and
aggressively.
Jack Wade Nowlin, The JudicialRestraintAmendment: Populist ConstitutionalReform in
the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 175-76 (2002) (citations
omitted).
10 Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's narrow reading of Marbury in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ([T]he Marbury tradition
does not give] the Supreme Court [the] power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon
Congress and the States.").
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further to that debate.
My focus, instead, is on the retention of authority and of legitimacy once the
legal framework confers the power of constitutional review. The ramifications of
authority retention are particularly important because judges make mistakes."'
These mistakes, when made concerning foundational matters of constitutional law,
can have profound effects.' Moreover, the retention by judges of authority to
definitively articulate and regulate the basic normative rules by which society is
ordered suggests a transference of sovereign capacity within the state from the
people, and their political institutions, to thejudges. 13 The result has been troubling
" Abraham Lincoln set the modem tone for nonjudicial approaches to judicial error. In
an exchange with Stephen Douglas during the 1858 senatorial campaign, Lincoln described
his opposition to Dred Scott:
We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the
court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free.... [B]ut we nevertheless do
oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to
vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of
Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with

the principles of that decision ....

We propose so resisting it as to have it

reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech During the Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial Campaign (Oct. 1858), in
3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LNcoLN 245, 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
Various governmental and nongovernmental actors continue to follow this approach,
opposing judicial construction of the Constitution in matters of religious rights and liberties
and certain individual rights - among them abortion and sexual rights.
2 "Mistakes," in the form of discarded constitutional interpretation have been significant
since the founding of the Republic. Judges themselves sometimes correct these mistakes. The
"separate but equal" jurisprudence of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), gave way
almost sixty years later to its opposite in Brown v. Boardof Education,347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Likewise, the doctrine of "liberty of contract," memorialized in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) gave way to a doctrine more deferential to governmental power to regulate
after West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Subsequent constitutional
amendments only rarely correct judicial mistakes. The constitutional law of citizenship, as
expounded in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), were only partially
corrected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and arguably undone thereafter in the
SlaughterhouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (narrowly construing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883) (narrowing the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to state action).
13 Abraham Lincoln raised this issue on the eve of the Civil War:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital
questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of
the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between
parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers,
having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN IN HIs OWN
WORDS

301 (Maureen Harrison & Steve Gilbert eds., 1994).
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for intellectuals for much of the history of the American Republic. But, what had
been a concern directed toward legislatures at the end of the nineteenth century,14
has become a more sharply defined "problem" at the end of the twentieth century.' 5
European commentators are becoming increasingly sensitive to the ramifications of
the transfer of what they call "competences." '1"The only controller of high courts
is public opinion and professional criticism."' 7
Yet, despite two centuries of inconsistent juridical constitutionalism, and the
warnings of presidents and commentators, the authority ofjudges has grown.'8 That

The French, and French constitutionalism, have traditionally been most wary of this of a gouvernment des juges. Indeed, one of the more influential studies of judicial
constitutionalism in France was devoted to a study of the constitutional functioning of the
courts in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. See tDOUARD LAMBERT,
LE GOUVERNMENT DES JUGES A LA LUTrE CONTE LA LEGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ETATS-UNIS

(1921) (arguing that judges exert a conservative force on constitutional development). The
American judicial model has provided reason enough for French political institutions to
avoid imitation in the restructuring of French political institutions.
" Thus, in his biography of Chief Justice Marshall, James Bradley Thayer, an influential
constitutional theorist from the end of the nineteenth century, reminded his readers that:
[t]he exercise of [judicial review], even when unavoidable, is always attended
with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary
way, and correcting their own errors.

106 (1901).
The issue has been framed in terms of evasion of the basic responsibility of citizens "in
a democratic polity. The problem is not that too many issues are 'constitutionalized' ... the
problem, rather, is that we assume that only the Court is authorized ...or is capable of
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL
'"

deciding constitutional questions." Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-MarshallFund
Lecture: Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 175 (1986); see also Sanford

Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (1987) (arguing
that the current system "legitimizes government by legally trained elites, speaking in
evermore esoteric language").
6 See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2431

(1991).
17

Ulrich Everling, ConstitutionalProblemsof the European Union - A Lawyer's View,

in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 286, 296 (Dieter
Schmidtchen & Robert Cooter eds., 1997).

"8An excellent example, perhaps, would contrast President Truman's reaction to
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the Steel Seizure Case in

which the Supreme Court struck down the President's order seizing steel mills during the
Korean War to avoid a shutdown of the mills) with President Lincoln's reaction to his
suspension of habeus corpus during the Civil War. President Truman, though bitter about
the decision, complied. See 2 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN: YEARS
OF TRIAL AND HOPE 474-78 (Doubleday Inc. 1956). President Lincoln, a little less than a
century earlier, took a very different approach:
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privileged place is protected by the cultivation of neutrality. 9 This neutrality based
on devotion to the law, rather than to the law's partisans, becomes essential to the
judges' status. That judges' jealously guard this appearance of neutrality and
impartiality was starkly evidenced in the opinions generated in the recent decisions
determining the winner of the presidential elections of 2000.20 In dissenting from
Lincoln ignored an order by Chief Justice Taney to release a prisoner in Exparte
Merryman, and his cabinet (under Andrew Johnson) gave equally scant respect
to the Supreme Court's command in ExparteMilligan that military trials cease.
But civil wars tend to strain the legal process, and none of Lincoln's successors
have been quite so brazen. President Eisenhower came closest when faced with
massive resistance to the Court's desegregation orders, for which Eisenhower
seemingly had little enthusiasm. Even Eisenhower, however, ultimately backed
the Court and acted to ensure that its orders were obeyed.
John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 983-84 (2002) (citations

omitted).
"9The traditional view of American judges as striving for neutrality is written into the
basic codes of judicial conduct. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000):
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or
affirmation before performing the duties of this office: "I, -, do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as

__

under the

Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 455(a) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.").
It is also a foundation of modem model codes of judicial conduct. See, e.g., MODEL
CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1990) ("A judge shall respect and comply with the
law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary."); see also, id. Canon 3(B)(5):
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or
prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,

religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's
direction and control to do so.
Id.
Modem commentators have suggested judges are neither neutral, nor are the principles
they deploy neutral. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITCAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (illustrating how some judges fall to the temptation to use
court decisions as a means to their ideological ends); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRrTICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTTUTIONAL LAW (1988) ("Understanding the work of
the court therefore requires that we give it a political analysis."). I do not mean to rehash
either concept in this manner.
20 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (debating how the proposed Florida state recount
implicates the Equal Protection clause in its analysis but failing to mention the political
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a majority opinion resisting a challenge to vote counting in Florida by the loser of
the presidential election in 2000, Justice Breyer expressed the fear that the decision
would erode public confidence in the neutrality of the Court:
That confidence is a public treasure. It has been built slowly over many
years, some of which were marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of
segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort
to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself. We run no risk
of returning to the days when a President (responding to this Court's
efforts to protect the Cherokee Indians) might have said, "John Marshall
has made his decision; now let him enforce it!".

.

. But we do risk a

self-inflicted wound - a wound that may harm not just the Court, but
the Nation.2
The American judiciary has come a long way from Marbury to Bush. There is no
reason to believe that judges will avoid constitutional opinions which can be, in the
disapproving words of Lincoln, "turn[ed] ... to political purposes."22

This article starts with the proposition that the stability of the authority of the
judge in American society suggests a religious, rather than a political, normative
basis. It is well understood that the relationship between constitution and judge is
often compared to that between scripture and priest.2 3 In the United States, this
relationship is usually tied to the idea of the federal Constitution as divine text. 4
repercussions of the decision itself).
2 Id. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting DAVID LOTH,
MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
22 Lincoln, supra note 13, at 301.

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN

365 (1948)).

"Judges are priests, not prophets. They are members of the structure of power, and
when they try to speak like Amos, they almost always sound faintly ridiculous. However, a
judge does not sound ridiculous when speaking like Moses .... Lewis Henry LaRue, How
Not to Imitate John Marshall,56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 836 (1999).
24 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrruTIONAL FAITH (1988); JOSEPH VINING, THE
23

AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986); Larry CatA Backer, Chroniclers in the

Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law and Interpretative Process, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 291 (2000) [hereinafter Chroniclers];David R. Barnhizer, Prophets,Priests,
and Power Blockers: Three FundamentalRoles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America,
50 U. PITT. L. REv. 127 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitutionas Scripture, 37 STAN.

L. REV. 1 (1984); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 123 (1979); Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets:Justice as Struggle, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1995); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and
Reason: A Theory of Constitutional"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1984); Philip
Soper, MetaphorsandModels of Law: The Judge as Priest,75 MICH. L. REv. 1196 (1977);
Michael W. McConnell, The Role ofDemocraticPoliticsin TransformingMoralConvictions

into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1509-14 (1989) (book review) (examining the role of the priest
in various Judeo-Christian denominations as interpreter of sacred text).
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These examinations of the judge as priest and the basic law as scripture, have
centered the judicial priest in the context of millennia-old battles over interpretive
authority within Western systems of religion. 25 "The parallels between the practice
of law and the practice of theology are too striking for the lawyer not to see. "26
Europeans tend to favor the language of ideology to theology, but it has a similar
effect.27
This analysis, while valid enough, misses an essential point critical for an
understanding of the permanence of judicial authority in the United States and
Europe. In order to understand the basis for the persistence of judicial authority, it
is necessary to examine the priestly role of the judge from a counterreligious
perspective. For that project, Nietzsche's priest and text, rather than those of
Western religion, provide the authoritative analogy. This article examines the
manner in which the judiciary plays the role of Nietzsche's Paul within the religion
American and European
of American and European constitutionalism.
constitutionalism now function like sin. "[T]he priest rules through the invention
of sin."2 8 The constitutional judge rules through the inversion of doctrine. From
this inversion arise the four great errors of modernity in law: (1) the error of
confusing cause and effect; (2) the error of a false causality; (3) the error of
imaginary causes; and (4) the error of free will. 29 These errors of causality are
lapses of spiritual or normative causes.30 Erroneous causality is the conscious and
25 Professor Levinson's work provides a case in point. He examines religious analogies
to interrogate the way in which lawyers and judges approach the authority of constitutional
text. See LEVINSON, supra note 24, at 9-53 (deriving a "catholic" and "protestant" approach
to the authority of constitution as text, and judges as interpreters of that text). Levinson states
further:
It should be clear by now that the ability of "the Constitution" to provide the
unity so desperately sought as a preventative against disorder depends on the
resolution of the same issues that split Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and indeed,
all other religions that have texts as a central part of their structure .... We are
not sure of what "the Constitution" consists, or how it is to be interpreted, or
who is to be the authoritative interpreter.

Id. at51.

26 VINING, supra note 24, at 188.
27 See, e.g., JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN

COURT OF JUSTICE: TOwARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE

141-80, 190-95 (1993)

(discussing legal and moral justification); HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 13-14
(1986) (discussing European judges' use of ideology to decide federalism disputes).
28 The Antichrist, supranote 1, at 631.

29 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 492-501
(Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1977) (1881-1892) [hereinafter Twilight of

the Idols].
30 For a discussion of this characterization, see WALTER KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE:
PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST 265 (4th ed. 1974).
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necessary product of a theological system that is denominated as "law" in the
United States and Europe, and that constitutes systems every bit as complex as those
theocratic systems that came before it in the Christian, Jewish and Muslim worlds."'
The interpretive doctrines, standards and tests that have grown up around
constitutionalism convert norms into a morass of the unknowable, except with the
guidance of judges speaking through courts. And so the judge creates mechanics
of authority based on a self-reinforcing dependence.
The examination of the religious analogy from a Nietzschean perspective might
seem odd or contrived. After all, the conventional religious analogy is
33
commonplace. Judges welcome it." Many segments of the population insist on it.
Organized religion has based its attack on the exclusion of religion from the public
sphere on it.' The practice of systems of religion within systems of law is efficient
3'

Religion, after all, comprises wholly developed systems of laws, as
comprehensive as anything devised by the secular state. Systems of Canon Law,
of Talmudic Law, of Shari'a have from time to time, and to this day, functioned
as separate, independent bases on which life and society are regulated. Law, in
these systems, is the form of expression, existing as the means of communicating
norms that proceed from the grammar emanating from the Word as received by
His servants on Earth. Religion as legal codex and jurisprudence demands an
exclusive allegiance every bit as jealous as that traditionally required by the state
in civil matters.

Larry CatA Backer, There Can Be Only One: Law, Religion, Grammar, and Social
Organizationin the United States, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICALANTHOLOGY 425,438

(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
31 Consider the controversy stirred when an Alabamajudge hung a hand-carved rendering
of the Decalogue in his courtroom. See, e.g., Dustin Zander, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten
Commandments on the Courtroom Wall: Judge Roy Moore and the Constitution,9 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 371 (1999); Mark Hansen, DecalogueDebateBack to Square One, 84 A.B.A.

J., Mar. 1998, at 22.
33 The academic version of this notion runs something like this:
Religion has pervaded political debate in America since the birth of the republic.
The Declaration of Independence invokes "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God" to justify freedom from England. It declares "unalienable Rights" of man,
including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," which are "endowed by
[the] Creator." The Civil War grew out of the abolitionists' insistence that God
abhorred slavery. Westward expansion was fueled by belief that God ordained
a manifest destiny for America. Religion loomed large in public debate over
Prohibition, civil rights, and American military involvement in Vietnam; it still
features prominently in controversies over issues such as abortion.
George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1, 30 (1999);
see also David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the PoliticalRole ofReligion: Civil Society and

Culture, 30 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 877 (1993) (explaining that religion plays a public role
through its influence in the broader realm of civil society and culture).
3' Roman Catholics teach that:
The inversion of means and ends, which results in giving the value of ultimate
end to what is only a means for attaining it, or in viewing persons as mere means
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it permits one system to serve two overlapping interpretive communities, each
resonating against the other.35
But Nietzsche?!
There are very few references to Nietzsche in the reported opinions of the
United States Supreme Court.36 In two of the most recent cases, Justice Scalia
raised the specter of Nietzsche in connection with the Court's approach to stare
decisis - prior judicial interpretation as authoritative, and binding as to the
interpretation on courts, legislatures and administrators. In PlannedParenthoodv.
Casey,37 Nietzsche was invoked as the creator of the basis for a theory of judicial
legislation and constitutional revisionism:
-

to that end, engenders unjust structures which "make Christian conduct in
keeping with the commandments of the divine Law-giver difficult and almost
impossible."
It is necessary, then, to appeal to the spiritual and moral capacities of the human
person and to the permanent need for his innerconversion, so as to obtain social
changes that will really serve him. The acknowledged priority of the conversion
of the heart in no way eliminates but on the contrary imposes the obligation of
bringing the appropriate remedies to institutions and living conditions when they
are an inducement to sin, so that they conform to the norms of justice and
advance the good rather than hinder it.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ] 1887, 1888, at 461 (1994).
3 Both law and religion in the West adopt the pattern of the nomocracy.
A Theonomy, or a Religious Nomocracy differs from theocracy. In a classic
theocracy, God is the ruler, and the means through which he rules - priests,
judges, prophets etc. - have very minimal flexibility. In a religious nomocracy
the divine law does indeed exist, but the power is invested in the hands of its
interpreters. As Aaron Kirschenbaum has observed, "The distinction between
theocracy and religious nomocracy is not merely semantic; its ramifications are
far reaching ....

Any Jurist knows that the law is not the ruler but rather its

interpreter." The fact that most of the interpretive and creative power is invested,
in a religious nomocracy, in the hands of the religious authorities may create a
tension between the divine will and those in charge of its interpretation.
Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Casefor Reevaluation and Constitutional
Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 617, 640-41 n.83 (1999) (citations
omitted). These notions apply to Christian and Muslim religious communities as well.
36 A Westlaw search of Supreme Court cases reveals only four cases in which reference
is made to Friedrich Nietzsche: Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217 (2000); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Comty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S.

1 (1945). Of those, only two of them refer to his philosophy or writings in application to the
decision of the case.
37 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this Nietzschean
vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges - leading a Volk who will
be "tested by following," and whose very "belief in themselves" is
mystically bound up in their "understanding" of a Court that "speak[s]
before all others for their constitutional ideals" - with the somewhat
more modest role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders.3"
In the other reference to the philosophy of Nietzsche, he is deployed as the
symbolic foreign devil. "Nietzscheanism" is corrupting the good morals of the
Court and in its corruption abandons the solid old-fashioned values that made the
American court great. Thus, Justice Scalia chided the Court for its corruption:
Justice O'Connor asserts that "[w]hen the Court changes its mind, the
law changes with it." That concept is quite foreign to the American
legal and constitutional tradition. It would have struck John Marshall as
an extraordinary assertion of raw power. The conception of the judicial
role that he possessed, and that was shared by succeeding generations of
American judges until very recent times, took it to be "the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," - not what the
law shall be. That original and enduring American perception of the
judicial role sprang not from the philosophy of Nietzsche but from the
jurisprudence of Blackstone, which viewed retroactivity as an inherent
characteristic of thejudicial power, a power"not delegated to pronounce
a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." 39
Justice Scalia, then, serves as the contemporary anti-apostle of Nietzsche on the
United States Supreme Court. In both cases, the reference to Nietzsche was meant
to frighten his colleagues by insinuating the monstrousness of theirjudicial project.
For Justice Scalia, stare decisis in both cases permitted rule by judiciary, inflated
the antidemocratic character of judicial review, and thus did great damage to the
original understanding of the judicial role in the Republic.' Despite his best
Id. at 996 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia was
referring to that portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion describing the need to adhere to stare
decisis. Id. at 854-55.
" Harper v. Va. Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 106-07 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The decision in Davis v. Mich. Dep't ofTreasury,489 U.S. 803 (1989), applied
retroactively to the benefit of the federal employee plaintiffs.
o Justice Scalia has been quite blunt about his approach to stare decisis:
It has been argued that we should not overrule so recent a decision, lest our
action "appear to be ...occasioned by nothing more than a change in the
Court's personnel.
...
I doubt that overruling Booth will so shake the
citizenry's faith in the Court. Overrulings of precedent rarely occur without a
change in the Court's personnel.... In any case, I would think it a violation of
38
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intentions to the contrary, however, Justice Scalia draws a valid characterization of
the work of judges that is worth exploring. Ironically, in articulating this view,
Justice Scalia himself personifies Nietzsche's priest.
The article means to demonstrate just how the metaphor of Nietzsche's
apocryphal priest - St. Paul4 - serves as an important normative model of
judging. It is divided into three parts. After this introduction, Part I first develops
the idea of the priestly type and its place within legal systems grounded in what is
commonly described as "the rule of law." Part I then evaluates the methodologies
of the exemplar of the American judge, the federal Supreme Court justice, and the
emerging "European" judicial exemplar, the justice of the European Court of
Justice, against the ideal type of the Nietzschean priest/judge. Part I introduces the
reader to text, the relationship of priest/judge to text, and the cultivation of errors
of causality as a necessary part of the use of text by priest to enhance control over
text, and on that basis, secure their position at the apex of the community. Part III
offers a brief argument of the utility of the priestly type within the normative
framework of the democratic state.

I. THE JUDGE AS NIETZscHE'S ST. PAUL
When Americans think of theirjudges in theological terms, the metaphor of the
authoritative congregant comes to mind. Recourse to the dominant religions in the
United States are usually made to fill the analogy. Thus, consider for example,
Professor Levinson's examination of the Catholic and Protestant models ofjudging
and the authoritativeness of text within American judging.42 Yet, such an
understanding, valuable as it truly is, does not help explain the nature of the priestly
function of judges. It is one thing to understand that judges function like priests,
it is quite another to understand why priests, whether in the tightly controlled
Catholic model, or the more freewheeling Protestant varieties, function as they do.
In order to understand the American judge/priest - and especially the American
federal judge, our trendsetter - it is necessary to look beneath religious habits.
Nietzsche provides a useful avenue towards that understanding by his examination
of the father of all priests - the Jew Saul, now known by many as the Christian
Paul.
my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified intrusion upon the
democratic process in order that the Court might save face.
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,824-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). For exploration of Justice Scalia's conservative political
visions, see, RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR.,
REVIVAL (1997); DAVID A. SCHULTZ

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE

VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

(1996);

& CHRISTOPHER

E.

SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL

CHRISTOPHER

E. SMITH,
(1993).

SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT
41 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 617-18.

42 LEVINSON, supra note

24, at 18-53.

JUSTICE ANTONIN
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Who is this priest Paul? Paul is the essence of the juxtaposable. Paul is a type
against which stands the ideal.43 In the case of religion, and the Christian religions
in particular, this ideal is Jesus, the Logos. "The very word 'Christianity' is a
misunderstanding: in truth, there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross.
The 'evangel' died on the cross. What has been called 'evangel' from that moment
was actually the opposite of that which he had lived."' For Nietzsche, Paul serves
as the bridge between the ideal - The Christian - and the applied - Christians.
Paul sells himself as the necessary intermediary between conception and
implementation, between those who would follow Logos, and Logos itself. Paul
memorializes the lived experience of the evangel, and in so doing, is instrumental
in its conversion from lived experience to binding, normative structure. The life of
the evangel is reduced to legal code, the operation of which needs an intermediary
- a seer, an interpreter. 45 But in the reduction to code, the story of the evangel is
transformed, something of the evangel is lost, and something else - the priest emerges. The person who tells the story, who creates a codex out of life, becomes
the owner of the retold story, that is, the person vested with the authority becomes
its highest interpretive source.
Without this strange story, however, without the confusions and storms
of [Paul's] head... [Paul's] soul, there would be no Christianity. Of
course, if this story had been understood in time; if Paul's writings had
been read not as revelations of the "Holy Spirit" but with an honest and
free spirit of one's own, and without at the same time thinking of all our
personal troubles, if they had really been read- and for a millennium
and a half there were no such readers - then Christianity would have
been done for long ago ....46

43I emphasize that the reference here is to a type, rather than to an individual. Nietzsche
"
was clear about the significance of the difference. "Among them too there are heroes ....
FRIEDRICH NIETzSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 203 (Walter
Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1977) (1881-1892) [hereinafter Thus Spoke Zarathustra]. In The
Antichrist, Nietzsche

wrote:

Decadence is only a means for the type of man who demands power in Judaism
and Christianity, the priestly type: this type of man has a life interest in making
mankind sick and in so twisting the concepts of good and evil, true and false, as
to imperil life and slander the world.
The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 593-94.
4 The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 612.
4 Thus, for Nietzsche, turning the liberating potential of the life example of the evangel
into a set of conforming rules had the opposite effect of liberation when imposed on those
who would follow Christ. See id. at 612-13.
' Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 76-77 (Walter
Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1977) (1881-1892) [hereinafter The Dawn].
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The priest stands between Logos and humanity. He is the mediator, and the
mediation is designed to preserve his power. "Disobedience of God, that is, of the
priest, of 'the Law,' is now called 'sin'; the means for 'reconciliation with God' are,
as is meet, means that merely guarantee still more thorough submission to the priest:
the priest alone 'redeems."' 4 7 Transcendence of law, the "rule of law," becomes the
mask covering the critical relationship between law and its interpreter.
I know these godlike men all too well: they want one to have faith in
them, and doubt to be sin. All too well I also know what it is in which
they have most faith. Verily, it is not in afterworlds and redemptive
drops of blood, but in the body, that they too have most faith; and their
body is to them their thing-in-itself. But a sick thing it is to them, and
gladly would they shed their skins. Therefore they listen to the
preachers of death and themselves preach afterworlds. *
This lust to power that drives the priest and accounts for his methods, is not limited
to an occupation. As a type, the priest exists in any relationship in which one
person stands as sole mediator of the good with respect to others, who are contented
to seek the meaning of the good only from the priest.49 "What is good? Everything
that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What
is bad? Everything that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that
power is growing, that resistance is overcome."5
Thus, the great power of the priest derives from his invention of a direct
connection between priest and the Divine. The acceptance by the community of
believers of this connection - or in the language of constitutional theory, the
sovereign act of the community adopting a constitution defining the relations
between the community and its institutions - permits an appropriation by the priest
of a privileged place in the relationship between humans and the Divine.5 The
priest "knows only one great danger, consequently 'God' knows only one great
4 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 597-98.
48 Thus Spoke Zarathustra,supra note 43, at 145.
49 But thus I counsel you, my friends: Mistrust all in whom the impulse to punish
is powerful. They are people of a low sort and stock; the hangman and the
bloodhound look out of their faces. Mistrust all who talk much of their justice!
Verily, their souls lack more than honey. And when they call themselves the
good and the just, do not forget that they would be pharisees, if only they hadpower.
Id. at 212.
50 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 570.
5' "I have found the theologian's instinctive arrogance wherever anyone today considers
himself an 'idealist '- wherever a right is assumed, on the basis of some higher origin, to
look at reality from a superior and foreign vantage point." The Antichrist, supra note 1, at
574-75.
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danger."52 What follows, of course, works to the advantage of the type of the priest.
"They have called 'God' what was contrary to them and gave them pain; and verily,
there was much of the heroic in their adoration. And they did not know how to love
their god except by crucifying man.

53

The type of the priest is the archetype of the sort who would alter the world in
the service of self-perpetuation as the arbiter, "the type of man who demands power
in Judaism and Christianity, the priestly type: this type of man has a life interest in
making mankind sick and in so twisting the concepts of good and evil, true and
false, as to imperil life and slander the world."54
Indeed, the priest would change God to suit his purpose. Those in control of
God can make and remake the deity through recourse to the Divine word. s" This
remaking adds a certain utility to Logos, providing the basis, outside of the
individual, on which individuals can base their control over others.
The creatorthey hate most: he breaks tablets and old values. He is a
breaker, they call him lawbreaker. For the good are unable to create;
they are always the beginning of the end: they crucify him who writes
new values on new tablets; they sacrifice the future to themselves
they crucify all man's future. 6
This basic notion of the nature of the authority of priests, of those who would judge
their community from a position of authority created outside of that community, is
echoed often in the works of Nietzsche:
[H]e calls a state of affairs in which the priest determines the value of
things "the kingdom of God"; he calls the means by which such a state
is attained or maintained "the will of God"; with cold-blooded cynicism

52

The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 628.

5 Thus Spoke Zarathustra,supra note 43, at 204.
54 The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 594. Nietzsche commented esleswhere:
It was the sick and decaying who despised body and earth and invented the
heavenly realm and the redemptive drops of blood: but they took even these
sweet and gloomy poisons from body and earth. They wanted to escape their
own misery, and the stars were too far for them.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,supra note 43, at 144.
" The concept of God becomes a tool in the hands of priestly agitators, who now
interpret all happiness as a reward, all unhappiness as punishment for disobeying
God, as "sin": that most mendacious device of interpretation, the alleged "moral
world order," with which the natural concepts of cause and effect are turned
upside down once and for all.
The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 595.
56 Thus Spoke Zarathustra,supra note 43, at 324-25.
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he measures peoples, ages, individuals, according to whether they
profited or resisted the overlordship of the priests."
The priestly type is, thus, essentially a parasite. Yet he is a parasite that finds
a welcoming home in every culture. He exists because communities insist on the
creation of the office. Judges, like priests, understand the consequences of a world
in which communities take comfort from the supposition that "man does not know,
cannot know, what is good for him, what [is] evil: he believes in God, who alone
knows it. Christian morality is a command; its origin is transcendent; it is beyond
all criticism, all right to criticism."58 Nature understands its needs. Parasites exist
because nature has created creatures whose function is to serve as hosts. These
creatures, these communities, thrive only in symbiosis with the parasite.59
Why should we care? If indeed, as we have come to agree, the judge represents
the priestly type, if there is something to "the possibility that the practice of law
today is most like the practice of theology,"' then Nietzsche provides a bracing
analysis of the pathologies of the priest in the West. Certainly, stripping away the
holiness of time and tradition from the functioning of the judiciary, it is possible to
see in our judge/priest the pathologies of the self-preserver that would remake the
world to secure his place atop it, alongside the legislator and the executive. And it
is possible to understand these pathologies as the foundation for ajurisprudence of
preservation. Judges retain authority through an assiduous cultivation, an
unconscious refinement, perhaps, of the cult of the judge as an indispensable feature
of the religion (rule) of law.
A. The American Judge/Priest
I can think of no finer example of the Nietzschean priestly type than the current
Chief Justice, and no more brilliant pronouncement of the primary purpose of the
priest than in the Supreme Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore.' Consider the
Nietzschean reevaluation of values, the inversions, required to support the rationale
of the Chief Justice for deciding the outcome of the election for President:

7 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 596.
58

Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 516.

59 See discussion infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
60 VINING, supra note 24, at 187.
6' 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). Bush is particularly interesting because, though the
Court appears to speak in a singular and veiled voice - a per curiam opinion - it is clear
that the case reflected a battle among the priests with respect to the nature of their functioning
within the theological framework they had designed. See id.
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None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are
the Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the
Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the
people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When
contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes
our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.62
This inversion is not merely a matter of my delusion. The Chief Justice took a
conscious pride in his priestly manipulations:
Just weeks after the controversial Supreme Court decision that ended
manual recounts in Florida's presidential voting - effectively awarding
the White House to George W. Bush - Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist gave a little-noticed history lecture suggesting that sometimes
members of the court may have to become involved in political matters
to prevent a national crisis.
Discussing the role of Supreme Court justices in a commission that
decided the disputed 1876 election in favor of Republican Rutherford B.
Hayes, Rehnquist argued that their involvement was vindicated by the
results.63

Here is Nietzsche's Paul, and Nietzsche's Luther. Here is the propounding of a
priestly-centered conception of the state. Here is the church at the center of the life
of the community - God's representative on earth through whom all questions
must seek final resolution.
But Chief Justice Rehnquist is not unique among the occupants of the American
equivalent of the throne of St. Peter. America has produced a Paul every bit the
match of the original. John Marshall is the exemplar parexcellence of the type. He
is a man whose work parallels, whose work provides a legal analogue to, the work
of Nietzsche's St. Paul. Paul's life work was inversion. For Paul, Jesus' death
provided the gateway to the error of false causality: it "had to be necessary, had to
have meaning, reason, the highest reason; a disciple's love knows no accident."'
The federal Constitution was John Marshall's Jesus. Its meaning and reason could
not merely exist; rather, a foundation of that reason had to provide meaning for the
judge. The disciple's love does indeed know no accident; it demands reciprocation.
Paul disciplined the Logos through the doctrine of judgment. 65 The regulation of
62

Id. at 111.

63

Charles Lane, Rehnquist: Court Can Prevent a Crisis: Chief Justice Cites 1876

Election Role, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2001, at A24.
64 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 614.
65 Id. at 618.
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humans in preparation for judgment upon death required rules which could only be
validated by the priest. Marshall disciplined the Constitution through a doctrine of
judgment as well - the regulation of the political community for the perpetuation
of the Constitution's divine principle of a more perfect union, the rules for which
could only be validated by the judge.66 Even the very nature of the soul was in the
hands of the priest after Paul,67 as the nature of the sovereignty of the state was in
the hands of the judge after Marshall.6" It was to the will of the priest that the life
of the evangel was bent.' It was to the overlordship of the judge that the
constitutional order was reinvented. "The 'God' whom Paul invented... is in truth
merely Paul's own resolute determination to do this: to give the name of 'God' to
one's own will."'7 Paul looked beyond the lived life of the evangel to make the
authority of the priest plausible.7 John Marshall looked beyond the text of the
Constitution for the construction of the powers of the judicial priest. Postresurrection and extra-constitutional areas are both areas beyond human reckoning.
But both priest and judge induce us to vest in each of them a power to see well
beyond the ordinary. Holding a monopoly on knowledge, judge and priest attain a
monopoly on guidance. Each becomes indispensable. 72 In this way both
Nietzsche's Paul and Nietzsche's John Marshall bend and control. In this way, both
are parasites - dependent upon and acting through a false relation between the type
they represent and the text they alone can read. Nietzsche's Paul reminds us that
if we had not had a John Marshall, we would have had to invent him.73 Admission
' See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). Thus the birth of judicial
review is bound up in the role of the priest - the "essence" of the judicial function. This is
the core meaning of saying what the law is. This is a tenet of the power of the judge that has

survived the centuries. The current version of this principle was uttered in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that states are prohibited from adding

qualifications to congressional representatives representing the people of that state).
See The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 610-12.
"8 Here, John Marshall adopting the role of St. Paul births an enduring view of federal
sovereignty in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9 [T]he priest formulated once and for all, down to the large and small taxes he
was to be paid ... what he wants to have, "what the will of God is." From now
on all things in life are so ordered that the priest is indispensable everywhere; at
67

all natural occurrences in life ....
The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 597.
70 Id. at 627.
7' See generally The Antichrist, supra note 1 (discussing inter alia how Paul used the
faith in Jesus' immortality that became the doctrine of judgment to empower priests);
Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29 (stating that the psychology of will was originated by
priests who wanted to create, through them, the right to punish for God).
72 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 595-98.
7 Of course, the role of the priest is not limited to the "high priest." Though I focus on
the "high priests" of American judicial culture, the culture of judging extends all the way
down the hierarchy of the judge. Nor is the culture of the judge dependent upon a particular
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to any fraternity of power is usually sufficiently alluring to make it the object of the
74
ambitious in every generation.
However, the American judge/priest does not assert and maintain her power by
the mere expedient of existence, as such. The judge/priest's tools are the techniques
of interpretation through which she, and she alone, come to speak authoritatively
to the masses,7" and to the coordinate branches of government as well.76 The
common-law methodology of courts, "a process of argumentation, as a body of
political ideology other than an adherence to the ideology of judging. All judges, liberal or
conservative, play this role. For a discussion of a particularly visible expression of the
ideology of the judge, see Larry Catd Backer, Race, "The Race," and the Republic:
Reconceiving JudicialAuthority After Bush v. Gore, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 1057 (2002)
[hereinafter Race, "The Race," and the Republic].
7' Truth confirmed by experience of ages that every individual,and all bodies of
men invested with power, always attempt to increase it, and never part with any
of it but by force. It is the very nature of man. The National government will
possess this desire and having the means it will in time carry it into execution.
Samuel Chase's Notes of Speeches Delivered to the Maryland Ratifying Convention (Apr.
1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 79, 85 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). While

this postulate of human behavior was accepted as basic to the American socio-political
organization by the framers of the Constitution, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
No. 10 at 80 (James Madison) ('The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes
of faction cannot be removed .... "), No. 59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961), its effect on the construction and constraining of a judiciary was dismissed, see, for
example, id. No. 81 at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) ("There never can be danger that the
judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard
the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the
means of punishing their presumption.").
" This speech, though directed at the coordinate or inferior branches of government,
applies now directly to the people in a variety of areas that are central to the daily existence
of people. These include interactions with the police power of the state, see, for example,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to inform suspects of their
Constitutional rights prior to interrogation), and the power to regulate morals, see, for
example, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state anti-sodomy law),
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a ban on interracial marriage), or to
create a hierarchy of life, see, for example, Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pa v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (examining abortion regulations and holding that a woman's
choice to have an abortion may be guaranteed against government regulation during first
trimester of pregnancy).
" See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (stating that
the President had no authority under the U.S. Constitution to seize steel mills during the
Korean conflict to avert a work stoppage). For a discussion of the means through which the
judge applies the balancing test to control the other coordinate branches of the federal
government, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REv. 54, 68-69, 77-83, 88-90 (1997) (citing
examples of situations where the Supreme Court invoked balancing tests to consider the
strength of governmental interest in tests of constitutional issues).
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cases which form a point of departure for reasoning by analogy and distinction,""
subjects institutionally-enforced conduct norms to a web of understanding at the
center of which stand the courts. In addition, and particularly with respect to the
interpretation (and thus regulation) of the actions of legislatures, there are many
modem methods of interpretation, created to maintain authority in an increasingly
complicated world.
There is no shortage of theories from which courts might choose. Scholarly
articles on statutory interpretation have proliferated over the last ten to fifteen years,
and there are at least half-a-dozen competing models, including new textualism,

intentionalism, "modified" intentionalism, "legal process," public justification,
dynamic interpretation, and public choice theories.78 There are, of course, any
number of additional theories of interpretation, and additionally important works
by other influential scholars of interpretation. 79 These developing theories of
interpretation can be deployed to wrest from the legislature a power over the law
which the legislature, at least in common-law countries, sought to wrest from the
judiciary in the first place, by "draft[ing] statutes with particularity... so as to
wrest from judicial control a particular situation for which the legislator wants to
alter the course of judicially created common law.""0 I will focus, for purposes of
71 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal

Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 82
(2001). "Common-law judges' skill and habit are in reasoning by analogy and distinction
between a particular confluence of factual circumstances and legal issues, to an accumulated
body of arguably similar and dissimilar prior cases." Id. at 83.
78 J.Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in
Disarray, 53 SMU L. REV. 81, 81-82 (2000) (footnotes omitted). The authors cite the
following works in support of the theories: William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (new textualism); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation
- In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983)
(intentionalism); REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
(1975) ("modified" intentionalism); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium on Statutory
Interpretation:Legislative HistoryValues, 66 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 365, 392-93 (1990) ("legal
process"); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999) (public
justification); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic StatutoryInterpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987) (dynamic statutory interpretation); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 423 (1988) (public choice theory).
" See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpretingthe Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (discussing
the theory of formalism); John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court: 1977 Term - Foreward:On

DiscoveringFundamentalValues, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5 (1978) (discussing instrumentalism);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899)
(discussing functionalism).
80 Curran, supra note 77, at 99.
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illustration, on two interpretive instruments from the American judge's toolbox contextualism (balancing tests) and functionalism. Both expose the nature of
judging best - a dual nature meant to further substance and authority.
The rise of the balancing test provides an illustration of the priestly method of
interpretation. Balancing tests are crucial for casting thejudiciary as a vital element
in the maintenance of the neutral and non-arbitrary cover of the rule of law.
Balancing tests make all substantive choices uncertain until the judge, not the
parties, provides the definitive balancing. The utility of balancing tests in
constitutional jurisprudence is well exposed at times of internal conflict between
members of the judiciary. One such period occurred at the end of the twentieth
century between ideologically liberal and conservative judge/priests on the United
States Supreme Court. A disaffected member of one of those political camps,
Justice Scalia, exposed the true value of the balancing test:
We have no way of knowing how often these ends are in fact achieved,
and the Court thus says little about them except to call them "an
important factor to consider." Having evaluated the interests on both
sides as roughly as this, the Court then proceeds to judge which is more
important. This process is ordinarily called "balancing,"... but the scale
analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are
incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is
longer than a particular rock is heavy. All I am really persuaded of by the
Court's opinion is that the burdens the Court labels "significant" are
more determinative of its decision than the benefits it labels "important."
Were it not for the brief implication that there is here a discrimination
unjustified by any state interest, I suggest an opinion could as
persuasively have been written coming out the opposite way. We
sometimes make similar "balancing" judgments in determining how far
the needs of the State can intrude upon the liberties of the individual, but
that is of the essence of the courts' function as the nonpolitical branch.
Weighing the governmental interests of a State against the needs of
interstate commerce is, by contrast, a task squarely within the
responsibility of Congress, see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and "ill
suited to the judicial function."'"
Indeed, Justice Scalia has been at the forefront of the judicial movement away from
assertions of bald, judicial authority, evidenced by techniques such as balancing
tests.8 2 In the application of the Religion Clauses, he has denigrated balancing as
81 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 896-97 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted) (criticizing the balancing test used in Dormant Commerce
Clause cases).
82 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
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"psychology practiced by amateurs." 3 In the context of the recognition of
privileges in the federal courts, Justice Scalia has criticized the use of balancing
tests as the basis for the recognition and regulation of such privileges."
Yet, exposure of the manipulative potential of the balancing test should not be
taken as evidence that Justice Scalia would deny the judicial priest use of
techniques, such as the balancing test, for the maintenance of judicial monopolies
over interpretive issues.
And yet that cannot be the entire explanation either, for Justice Scalia
himself has authored opinions in the religion area as elsewhere that are
not entirely rule-like. After all, in Smith itself, he wrote that generally
applicable laws may not be challenged for having a disproportionate
impact on religionists in violation of the Free Exercise Clause - only
to qualify that rule with exceptions for "hybrid" claims, such as free
exercise claims that are coupled with free speech claims or privacy
claims.8 5
Thus, in other areas, particularly in the context of the jurisprudence of the Eleventh
Amendment," Justice Scalia has remained silent as the Supreme Court has
constructed elaborate systems of balancing state and federal government
prerogatives.87 And in the context of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures,
Justice Scalia has affirmed the central role of the judge in determining the limits of
governmental police power - through the imposition of a balancing test. 8
(1989) (analyzing the relationship between general rules of law and judicial discretion); see
also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court: 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of

Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 24, 62-66, 83-88 (1992) (discussing Scalia's
aversion to balancing tests).
83 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invalidating official
prayer at a public middle school graduation, and criticizing the majority for espousing too
loose and flexible a conception of coercion under the Establishment Clause).
' See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (holding that the United States
acknowledges the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in its common law). For
Justice Scalia's criticism, see id. at 18-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV.
449,464 (2000) (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990)).
86

See discussion infra notes 157-61.

See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that a state cannot be sued in
state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act absent its consent); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Congress could not use the Indian Commerce Clause
to undermine the state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
88 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). Justice Scalia wrote:
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision,
we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure
87
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Like the rise of the balancing test as a tool of priestly judicial authority, the
development of a functionalist approach to the mediation of disputes among the
branches of the federal government - executive, legislative, and judicial provides an ideal example of the crafting of a doctrine where implementation
requires the intervention of the priest.89 These decisions follow the "tendency of
our recent separation-of-powers jurisprudence to treat the Constitution as though
it were no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches
should not be commingled too much - how much is too much to be determined,
case-by-case, by this Court."9 The examples of this approach have been both
numerous and contentious.9' In each of these cases, functionalism provided the
grease for the results reached in those cases. Functionalism preserves for the judge
the power to determine the character of a function at issue, and to apply that
characterization to the determination of an appropriate allocation of power among
the coordinate branches of government and between the federal and state
governments. 92 Impairments of the political functions of government are thus the
under the common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry
yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional
standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
Id. at 299-300 (citations omitted). Here, balancing seems to be historically compelled.
89 Functionalism, or instrumentalism, has been increasingly studied in recent years. For
a taste of some original sources of this interpretive tradition, see, for example, Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947);

Holmes, supra note 79.
90 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (holding that judicial participation in the work of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, an independent agency charged with rulemaking, did not constitute a violation
of the separation-of-powers doctrine, or of Article III).
But Justice Scalia tends to speak out of both sides of his mouth - especially where this
activity advances his own individual political agenda. Thus, Justice Scalia was not above
advocating the very functionalist approach he decried in Mistretta, when it was necessary to
save the line-item veto, dear to the hearts of activist conservatives in the 1990s. See Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
91See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (holding that judicial involvement in a legislative
agency did not violate the Constitution); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding
that Congress has the power to appoint Independent Counsel without violating the President's
authority); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (authorizing the President to
transfer Iranian assets through the IEEPA Iran Hostage); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425 (1977) (holding the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act did not
violate the separation of powers principle); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (analyzing the President's authority to seize steel mills).
92 Thus consider the possibilities given the Chief Justice's standard announced in
Morrison v. Olson (discussing the Independent Counsel Statute):
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subject for judicial regulation. It is error to presume that "interactions between the
Judicial Branch and the Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily
rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive's ability
to perform its constitutionally mandated functions." 93
But formalism serves the judge in his manifestation as Nietzschean priest as
well. Formalist analysis preserves in the priest the monopoly of rights in the
interpretation of plain meaning.94 Formalism, like functionalism, merely provides
related avenues for the assertion of judicial interpretation. Formalism does not
suggest in the least that the text is capable of a competent read by any lay official.
Indeed, the opposite appears to be true. A priestly formalism posits the existence
of a meaning to text that can be discerned only from the deployment of the arcana
of history and linguistic ability marshaled in the courts of the land.

In the context of the Religion Clauses, the judge/priest also acts as
arbitrator/regulator between and among religious communities, and between
religious communities and the institutions of government. Here is the judge/priest
in the role not of the Christian minister, but that of the priest of the Roman State

religion.95 The emphasis is on ritual, hierarchy, and the preservation of dominance
over ethics and morality. Smith96 puts this notion into practice. The judges in that
We do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the functions served by the
officials at issue is irrelevant. But the real question is whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to
perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question
must be analyzed in that light.
487 U.S. at 691. It is for the courts to determine the nature of the functions of the executive
and the character of the impediment to those functions posed by the contested activity.
Foundational power, even with respect to the core functioning of the coordinate branches,
thus, tends to fall to the judge.
" Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (stating that a sitting president has no immunity
to suit based on private conduct before or during his term in office).
9 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Comptroller General's
role in Graham-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act violated separation of powers); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (limiting congressional authority over immigration decisions
because congressional control violated separation of powers).
" For a discussion of the priest in Roman state religion in historical context, see ALAN
WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT RoMANS (1970). Watson comments:
The pontiffs [leaders of state religion] gave advice as to what the law was to the
magistrate and to the people. This gave them - and through them the patricians
- enormous influence, especially because of the paucity of statute and... of the
Edict, and because they controlled the forms of action (that is, the technical
requirements for bringing lawsuits). They used their powers of interpretation as
circumstances demanded - they could make a provision wide or very narrow.
To achieve their object they were prepared to misinterpret the original provision
deliberately.
Id. at 25.
96 Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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case stood as arbitrators among lower order communities - the religious
communities of priests subject to the overall regulatory will of the state. The act of
arbitration itself is infused with the symbolism of hegemony. It is the court, as
arbitrator, and not the parties, who has the power to set the standards under which
interpretive disputes and allocations of power can be made among religious
communities and between the state and favored or disfavored communities. 9'
This dominance of mediation is fiercely protected by the judicial priest, not
only against attack from the religious communities - as Smith clearly evidenced
- but also against incursions by other institutions of government. The most
dramatic example of this protection occurred in the context of the assertion by
Congress of a power to redefine and protect constitutional rights. Smith again
provided the setting. Using its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,98 through
which it sought to effectively overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation as
expressed in Smith.99 In voiding this exercise of federal authority, and especially
the authority to interpret the federal Constitution in contravention of a prior judicial
determination, the Supreme Court clearly exposed its cardinal purpose as the
institutional mediator par excellence, as well as the pedigree of its office extending
back to John Marshall.
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a
alterable
level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts ....
when the legislature shall please to alter it." Under this approach, it is
difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.
Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and

9 Michael McConnell nicely describes the power relationships, as well as the
consequences, perhaps without meaning to, in his critique of Smith. See Michael McConnell,
Free ExerciseRevisionism and the Smith Decision,57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1133-35, 1148
(1990) (discussing the difference in treatment of religious peyote use and religious wine use).
98 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(1994).
99 RFRA imposed on the government the burden to demonstrate that regulations that
substantially burdened a person's exercise of religion are in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and are the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling
governmental interest. The authority to impose this standard on inferior governments is
identified in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See RFRA § 2000bb(a)(3) (stating that
"governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling
justification"); § 2000bb- 1(b) (stating that "Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person - (1)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
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effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process
contained in Article V.100
How ironic! Consider how this, in a system designed as a Nietzschean priestly
state, would appear ludicrous - the inversion of the above-quoted passage to
substitute the Court and Article LI, for Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment!'0 1
Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has just recently informed us, courts do legislate
in the guise of interpreting;'0 2 there are no principles limiting the judicial power,
other than those bound up in ephemeral notions of popular sovereignty - the
exercise by the people of a "power" to ignore the court.0 3
'0
'01

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (citations omitted).
Thus, as applied to the judiciary, and turned on itself, the quoted provision might read

like this:
If [the Supreme Court] could define its own powers by altering [Article III's]
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and, like other acts .... alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it." Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle
that would limit [judicial] power. Shifting [judicial] majorities could change the
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V.
102 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). But apparently, only the Supreme Court may
engage in this practice without contradiction. For a discussion of this aspect of that case, see
Race, "The Race," and the Republic, supra note 73.
103 This power, when exercised on a small scale, can be evidenced in something as
mundane as what we have come to call jury nullification. For discussions of this, see

JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 57-95 (1994); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double
Jeopardy'sAsymmetric Appeal Rights: What PurposeDo They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341,

396-99 (2002) (suggesting that the jury's power to nullify is a kind of "check" on the
government). Jury nullification may become a formal vehicle for popular amendment of law,
at least as applied to individual litigants. See Molly McDonough, Jury Nullification on the
Ballot: South Dakota'sAmendment A Gets an 'F'FromState Bar, 1 N. 38 A.B.A. J. E-REP.
1, Oct. 4, 2002, availableat WL, JLR database. Judicial recall or impeachment drives are
more flamboyant demonstrations of this popular power. For a discussion, see, for example,
William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why
Court-CurbingMovements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483 (2002) (displaying the numerous
efforts to curb federal judicial power during the Warren Era). Irrelevance, however, is the
ultimate danger to the interpretive manipulations of the priest.

Thus, the Court is at once weighed down by the baggage of its doctrine and at
the same time using the complexity of doctrine as a way of hiding its expression
of personal politics in its decisions. Perhaps every organization must stand on its
own unique constitutional footing. Justice O'Connor once told us this in
connection with the University of Virginia's student fee program problems. Yet,
if this is the case, then constitutional jurisprudence truly becomes both complex
and irrelevant. Judgment based on the jurisprudence of peculiar facts, when all
facts are peculiar, becomes no jurisprudence at all -

instead jurisprudence is
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Thus, among the institutions of government in the United States, it is only the
courts, and their "priests ," who are endowed with the power to articulate normative
fundamental rights. Other institutions of government - the federal legislature and
executive, and state institutions - may articulate other normative expectations, but
those articulations carry no normatively fundamentalweight. It is in this sense that
one acquires a fuller understanding of Justice O'Connor's priestly form ofjudgment
in Kimel.0 4
Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is
clear that the ADEA is "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior ...... Our task is to
determine whether the ADEA is in fact just such an appropriate remedy
or, instead, merely an attempt to substantively redefine the States' legal
obligations with respect to age discrimination. One means by which we
have made such a determination in the past is by examining the
legislative record containing the reasons for Congress' action.'°5
Hence, the great contests over the nature and sources of fundamental rights of the
last century within the American courts, between those who viewed fundamental
rights as limited to that catalogue of rights that could be more or less strictly read
into the federal Constitution," 6 and those who saw the Constitution as enabling (or
not interfering with) the vindication of rights otherwise unenumerated within the
Constitution, 0 7 can be understood in two senses. The common understanding starts
reduced to the form of answer to the supplication made to an Old Testament
judge. Sadly, however, the cosmology of 21st Century Americans, unlike that
of the ancient People of Israel, does not infuse judges with the spirit of God as
the essence of the act of judging.
Larry Cati Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of Fundamental Rights: First
Amendment Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts of America and European
Alternatives, 36 TULSA L.J. 117, 141-42 (2000).
104 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that ADEA could not
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity).
105 Id. at 86-88 (citing in part Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
'0
For example, in San Antonio School Districtv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court, explained that only fundamental rights explicitly or implicitly
identified in the Federal Constitution could be the basis ofjudicial vindication. "Education,
of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." Id. at 35. "It is not the
province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws." Id. at 33.
07 This is illustrated quite nicely in Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
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from the presumption that these debates should be taken at face value, in other
words, the only debates in the cases concern the character and nature of the sources
of fundamental rights protected by the institutions of the federal government. But
these debates can be understood in a more subtle and important way. The "face
value" debate hides a more important contest which is centered on the distribution
- among the institutions of the federal government - of the power to articulate
(and thus name, expand, or contract) those fundamental rights.
Indeed, it is clear that the great debates of the twentieth century about the
sources and nature of fundamental normative rights presupposes, as a necessary
postulate, the fundamental norm that it is solely within the power of the judge to
determine the meaning and limits of norms. Thus, within these debates, we see the
American judge as the Nietzschean priest fully revealed.
B. The Judge/Priestin the European Court of Justice
The methodologies of the judicialization of politics is not confined to American
judges. Other systems of law have developed interpretive techniques for the
assertion of power. "Throughout the world, national high courts and supra-national
tribunals... have become important loci for dealing with the most pertinent and
polemical moral dilemmas and political controversies a democratic polity can
contemplate."' 08 In each of them, the techniques of the judge have reinforced the
place of the judge as an essential part of national political governance. 1'9Political
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state
action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this
is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments,
but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of
due process of law.
Id. at 326 n.4 (citation omitted). It is more forcefully illustrated in Justice Harlan's influential
dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan wrote:
However it is not the particular enumeration of rights in the first eight
Amendments which spells out the reach of Fourteenth Amendment due process,
but rather, as was suggested in another context long before the adoption of that
Amendment, those concepts which are considered to embrace those rights
"which are.

. . fundamental;

which belong . . . to the citizens of all free

governments," for "the purposes [of securing] which men enter into society."
Again and again this Court has resisted the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment is no more than a shorthand reference to what is explicitly set out
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
118Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicializationof Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global
Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 191,217 (2002).
9 An early expression of the political science of that involvement, still relevant, is Robert

Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker,
6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957).
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institutions have not resisted this juridification, and indeed, in some cases, have
embraced it."' Academics have rushed in to provide a theology for the judge as
Nietzschean priest on the international stage."'
The judicial institutions of the European Union (EU) serve as a dwelling place
of the Nietzschean judge. Professor Weiler echoes the now common understanding
of the effects of this sort of judging in describing how:
[D]espite the integrative radicalness of its doctrinal construct, with few
exceptions, the Court managed to hegemonize the EC interpretive
community, and to persuade, co-opt, and cajole most, if not all, of the
other principal actors to accept the fundamentals of its doctrine and of
its position in making the constitutional determinations for the
Community."2

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed from out of "general principles
of Community law," a great edifice of power." 3 The ECJ "has taken for itself, the
sole right of interpretation of the acts of the Institutions of the Community, arguing
that 'where the validity of a Community Act is challenged before a national court
the power to declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the Court of
Justice."" 4 Indeed, the history of the ECJ has been one of the accretion of
authority to the EU over matters to which neither text nor intent might have
referred. "' The power of the priest as self-preserver provides the basis for a better
o 'Traditionally, political institutions have other means of promoting their views, and the
resort to courts, because of its uncertainty, is not their favourite avenue for solving their
disputes. Yet, judicial politics have developed in an unprecedented fashion at the European
level." RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 97-98 (1998).
"I See, e.g., Lawrence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).

J.H.H.

WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR'?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 192 (1999).
112

113 Much has been written about the role of the ECJ in the construction of the EU, and
the
growth of its power. See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 184-223 (1995) (including citations at id. at 221-23). For a classic discussion, see
Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a TransnationalConstitution,75 AM. J.

INT'LL. 1 (1981).
"' Larry Catd Backer, The Extra-NationalState: American ConfederateFederalismand

the European Union, 7 COLuM. J. EUR. L. 173, 197 (2001). It is commonly accepted that:

Faced with the task of interpreting a constitutional framework that gives the
Community's institutions wide powers to implement its goals, the Court has gone
beyond the technical rules laid down in the Treaties themselves to establish the
fundamental principles on which the creation of the Community is based....
The principles in question are equality, freedom, solidarity and unity.
JEAN-VICTOR Louis, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 50-51
15 See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 5.

(2d ed. 1990).
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understanding of why such expansion, such function-expanding activity, can go
unchallenged within the community where the judge serves.
The "new legal order" rhetoric of the EU judiciary provides the conceptual
framework for norm making at the Community level by the ECJ. 16 Within the
constitutional context, the doctrines of autonomy and supremacy provide the
framework for the possibility of norm making at the level of the EU." 7
The doctrine of autonomy essentially posits the existence and
independence of the Communities as a political unit of government. In
its absence, what passes for the Community would amount to little more
than collective obligations of the constituent states. Autonomy is the
name the ECJ has given to the very notion of federalism so taken for
granted in other federal states. Autonomy contains the idea that the
Community is set apart from its constituent states. The Community,
taken as a whole (under the doctrine of unity), constitutes an
independent government with concurrent competence over the territories
of the constituent states. Autonomy serves as a shield against Member
State encroachment upon the governmental prerogatives of the
Community."'
In now often quoted language, the ECJ stated that:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose
benefit the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,
and the subjects of which comprise not only member-states, but also their
nationals. Community law, therefore, apart from legislation by the memberstates, not only imposes obligations on individuals, but also confers on them
legal rights. The latter arise not only when an explicit grant is made by the
Treaty, but also through obligations imposed in a clear, defined manner, by the
Treaty on individuals as well as on member-states and on the Community
institutions.
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963]
C.M.L.R. 105, 129 (1963).
"' See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 5; see also Case 14/1964, Costa v. ENEL 1964
116

E.C.R. 585, 593, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).

By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EC Treaty has created its
own legal system which, on entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral
part of the legal systems of the member-states and which their courts are bound
to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited duration having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of
representation on the international plane, and more particularly, real powers
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States
to the Community, the member-states have limited sovereign rights, albeit within
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their
nationals and themselves.
Id. at 593.
"18 Larry Cat Backer, ForgingFederalSystems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict:
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The European judges/priests' techniques of interpretation, like those of their
American federal counterparts, provide the vehicle through which the judges, and
they alone, speak authoritatively to the masses," 9 and to the coordinate branches of
government as well.1 ° The development and control of general principles of
Community law provides the greatest tool of judicial control of substantive norm
making within the EU.' 21 More importantly, the ECJ has crafted for itself the
The Example of the EuropeanUnion, 12 EMORY INT'LL. REv. 1331, 1339-40 (1998) (citing
Case 9/65, San Michele v. High Authority, 1967 E.C.R. 1, and Case 34/73, Variola SpA v.
Anministrazione italiana delle Finanze, 1973 E.C.R. 981).
1 ' The doctrine of direct effects, and the doctrine of state liability to individuals for failure
to transpose directives, are two of the legal tools through which the ECJ has connected
directly to the masses. For the doctrine of direct effects, see, for example, Case 26/62, Van
Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
[T]he Court held in Frankovich and Others . .. that the principle of State
liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of
Community law for which it can be held responsible is inherent in the system of
the Treaty. It follows that that principle holds good for any case in which a
Member State breaches Community law, whatever be the organ of the State
whose act or omission was responsible for the breach. In addition, in view of the
fundamental requirement of the Community legal order that Community law be
uniformly applied... the obligation to make good damage caused to individuals
by breaches of Community law cannot depend on domestic rules as to the
division of powers between constitutional authorities.
Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie Du Pecheur Sa v. Secretary of State for Transport ex
parte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1144-1-1145, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889 (1996).
For an example of how the doctrine of state liability for damages to individuals injured
by a failure to transpose directives has been applied, see Joined Cases C-6&9/90, Frankovich
and Boniface v. Italy 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993). The Frankovich
Doctrine has been refined considerably. See, e.g., Brasserie du Pcheur SA 1996 E.C.R. I1029 [ 31-33. For commentary, see Jane Convery, State Liability in the United Kingdom
After Brasserie du Pecheur, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 603 (1997).
120 See Opinion 2/94 on Accession of the Community to the ECHR 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759
(holding, by the European Court of Justice, that the EU did not have competence under the
EU Treaties to become a signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, unless the EU Treaties were amended to provide this
authority).
12 The issues of the origin, use and limitations of the concept, "general principles of
Community lawe remain controversial in Europe. I do not discuss those questions here. For
a general discussion of the genesis of principles of Community law, see JOXERRAMON
BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A
EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 71-79 (1993); NICHOLAS EMiuOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 115-33 (1996); D. LASOK
& J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 179-208 (5th ed.

1991); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust:Some Questions Concerningthe Role
of the European Courtof Justice in the Protectionof FundamentalHuman Rights Within the
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authority to determine the sources that it will refer to for purposes of this norm
making, and the interpretation of the power and authority of the institutions of the
2
EU vis-d-vis the Member States.12
As such, concessions of power to the federal level may be taken, as well as
given. The single most important concession of this type has not been taken by the
political bodies, but by the ECJ, which has embarked on the quite ambitious project
of creating the normative foundation for social and political union. In the form of
juridically-crafted fundamental principles of Community law, this appropriated
concession of power creates the framework within which all political and social
discussion must take place. This appropriation is not unconscious. 123 The ECJ
itself has not shrunk from conceding, on occasion, that the real basis for the social
disciplining of "fundamental principles" lies outside the "black letter" of the EU
24
Treaty.1
The ECJ has been faulted for looking outside of the EU Treaty. Anthony Arnull
related a criticism of Sir Patrick Neill to the interpretive methodologies of the
European Court: "The methods of interpretation adopted by the ECJ appear to have
liberated the Court from the customarily accepted discipline of endeavouring by
textual analysis
to ascertain the meaning of the language of the relevant
'
provision. 12
Indeed, the ECJ has been liberated, and that liberation has made
those subject to its authority more dependent on the court for the authentic reading
Legal Orderof the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1103 (1986).
12 For this purpose, the ECJ has chosen to look, not only to the general principles inherent
in the EU Treaty, but also to the general principles of interpretation and, more importantly,
to the general principles the ECJ finds that are (or have become) common to the laws of the
Member States. In Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
338, 13, at 354 (1974), the ECJ identified the sources from outside the EU Treaty for the
construction of general principles of Community human rights:
[T]he Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common
to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are
incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the
Constitutions of those States.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law.
Id. at 507.
123 "This process has been accomplished by the Court in order to provide the constitutive
Treaties with two essential characteristics of internal constitutions: the granting, by the
constitution, of rights to the citizens which can be enforced before the national courts, and
the supremacy of the constitutive Treaties ..."MARIA LUISA FERNANDEZ ESTEBAN, THE
RuLE OF LAW IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTTUTION 22 (1999) (noting, to this effect, the "circular
trend through which the Treaties are interpreted").
124 See Weiler, supra note 121.
125 ARNULL, supra note 5, at 515 (citing to a paper authored by Sir Patrick Neill QC,
uncited in the text).
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of text. Others echo this criticism, especially in connection with the ECJ's assertion
of a power to impose conduct norms in the arena of "human rights."' 26
But despite a certain amount of academic criticism, the ECJ continues to adhere
to a jurisprudence that has, as an objective, the retention by the ECJ of its authority
to determine the scope of those general principles of Community law that may be
imposed on the Member States, and all who reside within them.'2 7 In effect, an
organ of the supranational entity now reserves to itself the power to determine the
28
extent of its power to define the conduct parameters of all subordinate entities. 1
This is a very neat trick, one that significantly increases the power of the EU for
the purposes of doing "good things," but also one that permits a substantial
intrusion into the autonomy of the Member States. 2 9 It is now left to the ECJ,
within the parameters that the ECJ itself has defined, to designate the base line and
limits within which (non-dangerous) deviation will be permitted 3 ' through the
Court's power to declare "fundamental principles of Community law." 13'
126 See Weiler, Distrust, supra note 121. There is only one reference to "general

principles" in the primary law. Article 288 (formerly Article 215) of the European
Community (EC) Treaty provides for European Economic Community (EEC) liability in noncontractual matters, "in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the
Member States." European Community Treaty, art. 288, 1 EUROPEAN UNION SELECTED
INSTRUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE TREATIES 331 (1999) [hereinafter European Community
Treaty]. See LouIS, supra note 114, at 68 (suggesting that this is a specific reference to a term

of general applicability). The ECJ, however, may have taken inspiration from other sources.
See, e.g., LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 121, at 180 (stating "[Ajrticle 173(l)... enables [the
ECJ] to annul Community acts which 'infringe the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its
application."').
127 See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW (1999).
128 Certainly, since Stauder, the ECJ has asserted that fundamental rights are "enshrined
in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court." Case 29/69, Stauder
v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 1 7, at 425 [1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 112, 7, at 119
(1970).
129 It also permits the institutions of the supranational entity to resist intrusions into its
power from potentially competing organs of norm making. Thus, for example, the ECJ has
resisted permitting the EU from acceding to the Council of Europe's 1950 Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See, e.g., Giorgio Gaja, Opinion
2/94, Accession by the Community to the EuropeanConventionfor the ProtectionofHuman
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Given on 28 March 1996, Not Yet Reported, 33
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 973, 989 (1996).
130

Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur

Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, [1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 255 (1970).

Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143, [1996] 2
C.M.L.R. 247, 18 (1996). On the interpretive and supraconstitutional utility of principles
in continental (and especially European) law, see, for example, TRIDIMAS supra note 127.
Professor Tridimas makes two points worth remembering:
First, it must be emphasized that the significance of general principles is not
exhausted in their gap filling function. They express constitutional standards
131
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As significant to the enhancement of judicial authority - and to the
construction of a regime of general principles of law within a framework of
autonomy, supremacy and direct effect - was the framework created by the EC
Treaty for review of EU issues in the national courts of the Member States.132 That
framework provided the raw materials - legal disputes with potential Community
law issues - that fueled the juridification project of the European Nietzschean
judge. Article 234's references functioned as "the keystone in the edifice [of ECJ
jurisprudence]; without it the roof would collapse and the two pillars [the doctrines
of direct effect and supremacy] would be left as a desolate ruin, evocative of the
temple at Cape Sounion - beautiful but not of much practical utility.' ' 33 Hjalte
Rasmussen correctly observed how the ECJ was able to use the reference system as
a vehicle for dividing judicial authority between it and the national courts of the
Member States. " "The entailing presentation of the resolution of the Community's
federalism conflicts as being a by-product of a complex cooperation between
(apolitical) judges on national and central levels of government served to yield the
impression that, now, all had become a matter of pure law."' 35 Indeed, juridification
through the application of general principles extended the power of the national
courts of the Member States, even as the substance of the doctrines eroded the
power of the Member States themselves in relation to the institutions of the EU. As
between the judges, at every level of the EU, the net gain to authority more than
compensated for shifts of lawmaking authority from the Member States to the
institutions of the EU.136
underlying the Community legal order so that recourse to them is an integral part
of the [ECJ's] methodology. The second point follows from the first. Once it is
accepted that the general principles embody constitutional values, they may bear
determinative influence on the interpretation of written rules, irrespective of the
existence of gaps. In fact, the logical sequence may be reversed. Legislative
provisions may be interpreted in light of the underlying premises of the legal
system insuch a way as to leave gaps which then need to be filled by recourse
to general principles.
TRDIMAS supranote 127, at 10.
...Article 234 (formerly Article 177) of the EC Treaty confers on the ECJ jurisdiction to
give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty and the acts of the
EU Commission and Council where such a question is raised before the national courts of
the Member States. See European Community Treaty, supra note 126, at 293. For a
discussion of the provision, see PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BJRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES,
AND MATERIALS 406-52 (2d ed. 1998).
133 G.Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional
Challenge Facingthe European Court, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 2-3 (1991) (referring in text to

Article 177, which is now Article 234).
134See HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND PoucY IN THE EUROPEAN
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 250-53 (1986).
13"Id. at 251.
136 On the basis

COURT OF JUSTICE:

of the principle of supremacy, all national courts now exercise the
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Thus, the model of the judge/priest suggests an inversion, not apparent, from
an understanding of the judge as priest in the conventional sense. Nietzsche's
understanding of the priest forces us to look deeper for an understanding of the
inherent nature of the judge/priest. We can see more clearly the core of the priestly
functions - self-preservation, self-importance. This casts the nature of interpretive
jurisprudence in a very different light. Who else but the court can divine the
requirements of the basic law under these patterns of construction? Consider in this
light Justice O'Connor's description of the judge's task in Establishment Clause
cases: "Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution instead depends
on the hard task of judging - sifting through the details and determining whether
the challenged program offends the Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires
courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each
case."'

137

The rhetorical finery of the judges of the ECJ is no less compelling. What
scholars of American judicial interpretation have discovered about the interpretive
proclivities of American judges applies with equal force to the interpretive efforts
of the EU judiciary. Interpretation, as a judicial tool, "should be viewed by
scholars as embedded within deeply ingrained methods of decision-making which
confounds efforts to impose a single theory of statutory interpretation upon the
courts."' 38 It is the power to interpret, rather than the peculiarities of the forms of
interpretation, that sets the judge apart, and above.

power ofjudicial review of national legislative acts.... In matter of Community
law... such judicial review should be exercised by all courts as a routine matter.
This "empowerment" of ordinary courts was seen by some commentators as a
major explanation for those courts' easy acceptance of supremacy.
Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 177, 207-08 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Birca eds., 1999) (citing,
among others, K.J. Alter, The European Court's PoliticalPower, 19 W. EUR. POL. 458
(1996); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its
Interlocutors,26 COMP. POL. STUDIES 510 (1994)).
' Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,847 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For
a discussion, see Larry CatA Backer, The Incarnate Word, That Old Rugged Cross and the
State: On the Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the
Persistence of Comic Absurdity as Jurisprudence,31 TULSA L.J. 447 (1996).
138 Kelso & Kelso, supra note 78, at 84. This statement, examined from a Nietzschean
perspective, contains elements of miscausation. The premise that is grounded on the need for
interpretation to call for the adoption of its singularly highest and best form can be countered
by the premise that is grounded on the premise that the need to assert authority by the judge
results in the creation of multiple forms of interpretation to confound those who would seek
to wrest the authority to interpret away from the judge. For the effect of, and our delight in,
errors of causation in the structuring of our society, see discussion infra notes 157-208.
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II. THE JUDGES AND THEIR TEXTS

The source of a judge's authority, like that of the priest, is transcendent, rather
than immanent. The source of the priest's authority is God, that of the judge is
law.'39 Both God and law find concrete manifestation in text. Nietzsche's insights
on the connection among text, transcendence, and authority is crucial for an
understanding of the self-reinforcing nature of judicial power. A judge, like a
priest, derives her authority from a societal acceptance of her unique connection to
the ultimate manifestations of social power."
The American judge, like Nietzsche's priest, is ineffective without a text.
Followers must be confined by something other than the charismatic effect of
speech. Text serves as the basis of transcendent authority. The Bible serves as the
"priestly book par excellence."'' It provides the priest with her magic wand - her
connection and conduit to the divine. The text serves as the basis for the
perpetuation of the power of the priest. The text itself makes the priest
indispensable, and the priest constructs from the text a command to make the priest
indispensable.
One step further: the "will of God" (that is, the conditions for the
preservation of priestly power) must be known: to this end a "revelation"
is required. In plain language: a great literary forgery becomes
necessary, a "holy scripture" is discovered .... From now on all things
in life are so ordered that the priest is indispensable everywhere; at all
natural occurrences in life, at birth, marriage, sickness, death, not to
speak of "sacrifices" (meals), the holy parasite appears in order to
denature them - in his language: to "consecrate."'
Holy text requires a specialized socio-political class for its interpretation.
Interpretation, and thus the need for text, provides its audience pleasure.
Interpretation is an art, and, like any stage show, requires both audience and
"' "Judges derive authority from speaking the divine. Only when judges lose their
individual humanity, when they become the conduit for the vocalization of the voice of God,
can we say that judges speak with authority. Judges speaking personally, no matter how chic
today, carry no authority." Chroniclers,supra note 24, at 316.
140 The cultural model for this connection in the West traces back both to the West's
Graeco-Roman and Hebrew past. Id. at 315-18.
14' The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 628. In this paragraph, and through to the following
chapter, Nietzsche shows the way The Bible redescribes the story of Genesis, from the
creation of woman, to the tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, to the expulsion from
the Garden of Eden, and to the first destruction of humanity in the great flood, as a priestly
parable of the danger of knowledge for the office of the priest, and the need to create a false
causality of destruction following knowledge in an effort to contain knowledge to the priest.
Id. at 628-31.
142 Id. at 597.
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performer. That the performance is on a grand socio-political scale only heightens
the pleasure - like a strong narcotic.'4 3
Nietzsche analogized the relationship between priest and text to that between
parasite and host.'"
For the parasite in need of permanent employment,
interpretation has its own benefits. Interpretation permits the obscuring of text so
that its language becomes discernable only to those especially trained for that
purpose - those in direct communion with the divine.
How little Christianity educates the sense of honesty and justice can be
seen pretty well from the writings of its scholars: they advance their
conjectures as blandly as dogmas and are hardly ever honestly perplexed
by the exegesis of a Biblical verse. Again and again they say, "I am
right, for it is written" . . . how crudely the preachers exploit the
advantage that nobody can interrupt them, how the Bible is pricked and
pulled and the art of reading badly formally inculcated upon the people
- all this will be underestimated only by those who go to church either
never or always. 45
It is the interaction of priest and text that gives rise to the peculiar ends of the
art of interpretation - authority connected to symbols of power. The interpretative
arts, and their monopolization in the hands of the judge, serve as the great tool of
priestly power. Interpretation - the art of reading "badly" - gives rise to the most
powerful of interpretive errors - those of an inverted causality.
The beginning of the Bible contains the whole psychology of the priest.
The priest knows only one great danger: that is science, the sound
conception of cause and effect. But on the whole science prospers only
under happy circumstances - there must be a surplusof time, of spirit,
to make "knowledge" possible. "Consequently, man must be made
unhappy" - this was the logic of the priest in every age.'46

43 To derive something unknown from something familiar relieves, comforts, and
satisfies, besides giving a feeling of power .... [F]irst principle: any explanation
is better than none .... [T]he first representation that explains the unknown as
familiar feels so good that one "considers it true." The proof of pleasure ("of
strength") as a criterion of truth.... Consequence: one kind of positing of causes
predominates more and more, is concentrated into a system, and finally emerges
as dominant, that is, as simply precluding other causes and explanations. The
banker immediately thinks of "business," the Christian of "sin."
Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 497-98.
'44 See The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 596-98.
"' The Dawn, supra note 46, at 80.
146 The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 629-30.
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The danger posed by the "sound conception of cause and effect" and the ability of
the priest to distort this "science" form the core of Nietzsche's critique of the
priestly function. Its elaboration is centered on the "four great errors" of causality.
"Every single sentence which religion and morality formulate contains it; priests
147
and legislators of moral codes are the originators of this corruption of reason."'
The errors of causation are related. 4 ' The first three describe reversals or
improbable causation - mistaking causes for effects, assuming a false causality,
49
and creating an imagined causality. The last error is the assumption of a free will. 1
Here is causation one step removed. "Men were considered 'free' so that they might
be judged and punished - so that they might become guilty."'50 Free will in this
sense was created to make people dependent upon the judge. In this case, an error
of the causality of the will leads to the judge. The judge connects the causality of
the will to the inversion and invention of causes and effects in law.' 5'
Paul wanted the end, consequently he also wanted the means. What he
himself did not believe, the idiots among whom he threw his doctrine
believed. His need was for power; in Paul the priest wanted power once
again - he could use only concepts, doctrines, symbols with which one
tyrannizes masses and forms herds. What was the one thing that
Mohammed later borrowed from Christianity? Paul's invention, his

7 Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 492.

Walter Kaufmann understands the four errors as part of "Nietzsche's occasional
insistence on a reversal of cause and effect, which would seem to imply a deprecation of
consciousness [that] mustbe understood as a polemical antithesis against current prejudices."
KAUFMANN, supra note 30, at 265.
Wherever responsibilities are sought, it is usually the instinct of wanting to judge
and punish which is at work.... [T]he doctrine of the will has been invented
essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is, because one wanted to impute
guilt. The entire old psychology, the psychology of will, was conditioned by the
fact that its originators, the priests at the head of ancient communities, wanted
to create for themselves the right to punish - or wanted to create this right for
God. Men were considered "free" so that they might be judged and punished so that they might become guilty: consequently, every act had to be considered
as willed, and the origin of every act had to be considered as lying within the
consciousness.
Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 499-500.
l50 Id. at 499.
II5l
am moved by compassion for these priests. I also find them repulsive; but that
matters least of all to me since I have been among men. But I suffer and have
suffered with them: prisoners they are to me, and marked men. He whom they
call Redeemer has put them in fetters: in fetters of false values and delusive
words. Would that someone would yet redeem them from their Redeemer!
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,supra note 43, at 203.
'4

"4
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means to priestly tyranny, to herd formation: the faith in immortality that is, the doctrine of the "judgment.,152
Thus, from the first reversal of causation, from the first creation of false and
imaginary causality, from the illusion of free will, arises theology - and
jurisprudence.' 53 These twistings of causality are then, in another reversal of cause
and effect, memorialized in the Logos created for the priestly caste to construct, and
from which the priest derives his authority."
The four errors describe and predict the manner in which the socio-political
priestly caste relates to, and operates in, the community over which it seeks to
preserve its position. It has become a formidable weapon in the battle between the
religious and judicial priests over the control of institutional expression of
community norms. Catholic thought, though not unique among the religious castes,
is worth considering for the beauty of its expression:
The inversion of means and ends, which results in giving the value of
ultimate end to what is only a means for attaining it, or in viewing
persons as mere means to that end, engenders unjust structures which
"make Christian conduct in keeping with the commandments of the
divine Law-giver difficult and almost impossible."
It is necessary, then, to appeal to the spiritual and moral capacities of the
human person and to the permanent need for his inner conversion, so as
to obtain social changes that will really serve him. The acknowledged
priority of the conversion of the heart in no way eliminates but on the
contrary imposes the obligation of bringing the appropriate remedies to
institutions and living conditions when they are an inducement to sin, so
that they conform to the norms of justice and advance the good rather
than hinder it. 5'

The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 618.
"' For Nietzsche, the connections between these notions and Christianity were starkly
clear: "In Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of contact with
reality. Nothing but imaginary causes ('God,' 'soul,' 'ego,' 'spirit,' 'free will' - for that
matter, 'unfree will'), nothing but imaginary effects ('sin,' 'redemption,' 'grace,'
'punishment,' 'forgiveness of sins')." Id. at 581.
15
Thus, Nietzsche clearly posits the relationship between priest and text:
These priests accomplished a miracle of falsification, and a good part of the
Bible now lies before us as documentary proof. With matchless scorn for every
tradition, for every historical reality, they translated the past of their own people
into religious terms, that is, they turned it into a stupid salvation mechanism of
guilt before Yahweh, and punishment; of piety before Yahweh, and reward.
Id. at 595-96.
"' CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH I 1887, 1888, at 514 (1994).
152

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:117

The group of priests that can most successfully deploy miscausation, tends to
control the levers of institutional norm creation.
Is it possible to follow the trail of the judge/priest, to uncover these reversals
of causation in the reported cases? Perhaps. The creation of, and control over,
general principles of constitutional law provides an illustration of the utility of
miscausation in the service of the station of the judge/priest at the level of the
regulator of power balances among social and political institutions. For the priest,
these principles provide proof (the effect) of the need for a mediator between text
and people (for whom text is opaque). Yet, it may also demonstrate the effect of
accepting a belief that a text may speak outside itself, the cause of which is the
judge/priest interposing himself between people and text. 56 The United States
Supreme Court, the ECJ, and the German Federal Constitutional Court all provide
vivid examples of miscausation in the service of the Judiciary.
A. American Interpretivism in the Service of the Judge

The recent American jurisprudence over the constitutional value of the odors
and emanations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the federal Constitution
provides a telling example of the use of principle by the United States Supreme
Court to capture act and meaning under the American basic law.'57 We have been
instructed that the implications and logic of the Tenth Amendment produce a
division of authority between federal and state governments for which the sovereign
legislative and executive functions of the states mark a barrier. 5 8 The federal
structure of government caused the erection of this barrier against incursion by the
Thus, Nietzsche suggests that:
The "law," the "will of God," the "holy book," "inspiration" - all mere words
for the conditions under which the priest attains power, with which the priest
preserves his power; these concepts are found at the basis of all priestly
organizations, of all forms of priestly or philosophic-priestly rule... "Truth is
there": this means, wherever it is announced, the priest lies.
The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 641-42.
' For the development of Tenth Amendment doctrine, see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141
(2000) (holding Congress may restrict a state's ability to disclose a driver's personal
information without consent); Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (deciding whether
the federal government may command a state's executive to conduct background checks);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding Congress may obligate the states
to provide radioactive waste sites). For development of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, see
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding citizens of Maine could not sue the state under
the Fair Labor Standards Act); Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding Congress was authorized to allow suits by Indian tribes against states); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding a state cannot by sued by its citizen without its
consent).
' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (discussing legislative function); Printz,
521 U.S. 898 (discussing executive function).
156
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general government. Yet it can also be said that the desire for judicial mediation
of the political contests between general and state governments resulted in the
creation of a system of rules requiring judicial mediation of the barrier between
general and state government. The nature of the traditional political order was not
the cause of the creation of a zone of protection for states. Instead, the judge
revealed the nature of a traditional political order, the effect of which was to
produce a zone of protection for states, that served to inject the judge into the
contest between governments. Thus, Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in this
century serves the judge as much as it appears to serve the states.
In the Eleventh Amendment context, we experience the false, or imaginary,
cause. 5 9 Elevation of state sovereign immunity to the dignity of constitutional text,
in the absence of constitutional text, is based on a communication - or
"communion" - with the Constitution, reserved solely to the judge. Here is
wishful thinking of the Pauline sort, 60 transformed into a catechized false cause.
The Eleventh Amendment work of the Supreme Court illustrates another point
the utility of originalism for priestly miscausality. Originalism - a return or
preservation of the basic text as originally conceived - forms a central part of the
protection of the priest, whether in theology or law.' 6' Nietzsche suggests that a
return to the past, to the organizing basis of the past, is impossible - there is only
going forward, whether one looks backwards or forwards. "Yet all priests and
moralists have believed the opposite - they wanted to take mankind back, to screw
it back, to a former measure of virtue."' 62 Control of the past, of the authorized
version of the past, and its connection to the present, gives the judge/priest the
means to preserve his own power. Text - the Logos - can always be denatured
63
in the service of the judge.
159

Here the judge, like Nietzsche's Paul, "dresses up a hallucination as proof that the

Redeemer still lives." The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 618.
"6See Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 494-95, 515-16.
161 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court 1992 Term Foreword: The
Constitutionof Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 30 (1993); Morton J. Horwitz, The Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American
ConstitutionalHistory,50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 655,663 (1989) ("To the extent that Constitution
worship is America's secular religion, and all religions have a tendency towards
fundamentalism, originalism in constitutional discourse is the equivalent of religious
fundamentalism."). But cf Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALEL.J. 1501, 1512 (1989) (book review)
("Constitutional interpretation, performed in the manner of Orthodox Jews and Christian
fundamentalists, would seek specific answers to specific questions from a particular time in
the past (presumably the founding), and would enforce those answers in today's world,
notwithstanding considerable pressure arising from changes in context and circumstance.").
162 Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 546-47. "Even the politicians have aped the
preachers of virtue at this point: today too there are still parties whose dreams it is that all
things might walk backwards like crabs. But no one is free to be a crab." Id at 547.
163 See The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 595.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:117

Thus, techniques of interpretation, as well as interpretation itself, serve to feed
the miscausation at the heart of the judge's work. Like originalism, balancing tests
serve this purpose well. Balancing requires consideration of the context in which
concepts must be weighed against each other. Context-specific constitutional
judging requires a constant return to the judge for verification of appropriate
weighing. The process, by nature, reduces the ability of people to act without the
approval of the judge. "Psychologically considered, 'sins' become indispensable in
any society organized by priests: they are the real handles of power. The priest lives
on sins, it is essential for him that people 'sin.' Supreme principle: 'God forgives
those who repent' - in plain language: those who submit to the priest."' 64 Indeed,
Justice Scalia, himself, has long argued that the balancing test serves no one better
than the judge.

65

The interpretation of the federal constitutional right to a trial by jury 66 provides
another example. 167 Here we have a case of imaginary causality. 6 ' "[I]n other
words, it is in the realm of the abstract that the more important things happen in
these times, and it is the unimportant that happens in real life."'1 69 The Seventh
Amendment gives over to the judge the act of memory. For it is the judge that must
create a memory out of the text of the Seventh Amendment. In so doing, the judge
both creates a reality, where little existed before, and preserves for herself the task
of guarding and elaborating on that memory as time creates a greater distance
'64

Id. at 598.

165 See Scalia,

supranote 82, at 1175 etseq. (arguing that bright-line rules and categorical
tests produce a necessarily greater certainty, predictability, and fairness than flexible,
multi-factored balancing tests).
'66 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The text of the Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
Id.
167

For a history on the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, see Charles W. Wolfram,

The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973).
'

We are never satisfied merely to state the fact that we feel this way or that: we
admit this fact only -

become conscious of it only -

when we have furnished

some kind of motivation. Memory, which swings into action in such cases,
unknown to us, brings us earlier states of the same kind, together with the causal
interpretations associated with them - not their real causes. The faith, to be
sure, that such representations, such accompanying conscious processes, are the
causes, is also brought forth by memory. Thus originates a habitual acceptance
of a particular causal interpretation, which, as a matter of fact, inhibits any
investigation into the real cause - even precludes it.
Twilight of the Idols, supra note 29, at 496-97.
'69 1 ROBERT MusiL, THE MAN Wrrltotrr QuALrrIEs 76 (Eithne Wilkins & Ernst Kaiser

trans., 1953) (1930).
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between the event memorialized and current times. 7 ° This is easy enough, perhaps,
with respect to causes for which a jury trial is preserved - though even here there
are problems: the time, place and manner of such preservation were early issues
resolved by the courts. 7' More difficult has been the construction of memory
applicable in new contexts - the rise of new causes of action, and the abandonment
of old forms of procedure. In both cases, it has been left to the judge to return to the
place of memory and construct a recollection suitable for current times.'72 The
"' As time progresses, and the original witnesses die, then only the memorialized text of
the events survive, as well as the collective memory of the caste whose task it is to preserve
the memory. Thus, the Old and New Testaments both serve as efforts to preserve memory
for future generations, and as the basis on which those assigned the task of reading this
preserved memory are to proceed. The first four books of the New Testament are given over
to the Gospels, describing the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. For the English-speaking
world, each Gospel is aptly named - the term "Gospel" derives from the Middle English
God's spell or God's tale. Thus memory comes in two parts - orally, and in writing - and
it is to the priests that the teaching of the two traditions is assigned. See CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 76 (1994) (offering a traditional Christian exposition).
'7' See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 266, 275 (1830) ("[T]he amendment then
may
well be construed to embrace all suits, which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights."). This
rendering survived even the merger of law and equity in the twentieth-century federal courts;
see also, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959). The Court
opined:
If there should be cases where the availability of declaratoryjudgment or joinder
in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in all respects protect the
plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm while affording a jury
trial in the legal cause, the trial court will necessarily have to use its discretion
in deciding whether the legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Since the
right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however, while no similar requirement
protects trials by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must,
wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. This long-standing
principle of equity dictates that only under the most imperative circumstances,
circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we
cannot now anticipate, can the right to ajury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims.
Id.
112 In this sense, of course, courts serve a cultural function as well. The astute judge/priest
carefully tailors recollection to suit the popular conception of the day; obedience is thus
naturalized.
Courts function as chroniclers of the norms through which people sharing a
common culture understand themselves. The primary functions of courts are to
identify cultural practice and then to memorialize that practice as law. Juridical
expressions of law are essentially descriptive; standing alone, their
pronouncements cannot coerce cultural practices. As such, law is an enterprise
of affirmation.
Chroniclers,supra note 24, at 292.
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result - a collective agreement of the "reality" of the imagined causality on which
these exercises rest.
You have served the people and the superstition of the people, all you
famous wise men - and not truth. And that is precisely why you were
accorded respect. And that is also why your lack of faith was tolerated:
it was a joke and a circuitous route to the people. Thus the master lets
his slaves have their way and is even amused by their pranks.' 73
It is in this spirit that Tull v. United States'74 and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpers Local 391 v. Terry175 become all the more sharply understandable as a
"natural" product of Seventh Amendment interpretive form.
To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, we
examine both the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought.
"First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and
equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether
' 76
it is legal or equitable in nature. '
The resort to history can "leave us in equipoise as to whether respondents are
entitled to a jury trial,"' 7 7 and thus to the authority of the judge to put a definitive
gloss on that history, no matter how far removed from that history the object of
judging is lodged.' 78

Thus Spoke Zarathustra,supra note 43, at 214.
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
175 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (recognizing the right to trial by jury for allegations of breach
of
duty of fair representation under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
"'
174

1947).

176 Id.

at 565 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18).
Id. at 570.
,78 As Justice Kennedy suggested in dissent: "We cannot preserve a right existing in 1791
unless we look to history to identify it. Our precedents are in full agreement with this
reasoning and insist on adherence to the historical test. No alternatives short of rewriting the
Constitution exist." Id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But see Wolfram, supra note 167,
at 744-47 (1973) (suggesting flexibility as an alternative to judicial interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment). But even here, the power of history as an institutional object rests
with the judiciary.
177
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B. European Interpretivism:Textualism ParExcellence

The ECJ has been active in the creation of a set of general principles of law by
which it controls the exposition of the basic law of the EU.'79 General principles
of law in the EU context serve as an extraordinary mechanics of judicial control miscausation at its best. Said to be derived from the meaning or intent within the
words of the Treaty themselves, the general principles in fact serve to add to the
words of those very Treaties. 8 ° This is particularly the case with respect to the
provisions of the Treaties, which the ECJ must accept as valid. General principles,
as a set of rules of interpretation of the unchangeable, become the means by which
change can be effected. 8'
Thus, for instance, the ECJ has derived a general principle of community
law respecting non-discrimination and equal treatment from out of its
sense of the general direction taken by the EC Treaty with respect to
those concepts. Consider, Joined Cases 103 & 145/77, Royal ScholtenHonig (Holdings) Ltd. v. Intervention Boardfor AgriculturalProduce,
Tunnel Refineries Ltd. v. Intervention Boardfor Agricultural Produce

(first isoglucose cases), 1978 E.C.R. 2037, 1 C.M.L.R. 675, where the
Court, in interpreting EC Treaty Article 40(3) (prohibiting
discrimination between producers and consumers within the
Community), explained that the non-discrimination provision in that
article of the EC Treaty "is merely a specific enumeration of the general
principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of
Community law."' 82
"7 For a discussion of the rise and effect of general principles of Community law and its
effect on EU Law, see discussion supra notes 98-101.
S0 Emiliou suggests four applications of general principles in constitutional interpretation:
(i) to guide the interpretation of primary law, (ii) to guide the exercise of power under the
primary law, (iii) to provide criteria for determining the legality of acts, and (iv) to fill in
gaps in primary or secondary law to prevent injustice. EMILIOU, supra note 121, at 121.
''
Takis Tridimas, in his analysis of general principles in EUjurisprudence quite correctly
explained that:
Where courts are called upon to interpret rules which they have no jurisdiction
to annul, interpretation becomes the primary means by which they can influence
the effectiveness of such rules. Interpretation in that context becomes particularly
instructive as the expression of'judicial policy: it tells us what the court perceives
to be its function, what it considers to be the underpinnings of the legal system,
and how it prioritizes the rules of primary law of that system.
TRIDIMAS, supra note 127, at 33-34.
182 Larry CatA Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarityand CulturalDifference: An Essay
on the Dynamics of OppositionWithin Federativeand InternationalLegal Systems, 4 TULSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 196 n.40 (1997) (citing in part SACHA PRECHAL & NOREEN

BuRRows,

GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

2-6 (1990)
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A more interesting example, and one which reaches, in a sense, a position
opposite from that taken by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment," 3 concerns the use of a general principle of effectiveness
to interpret from out of the Treaties a right of individuals to obtain damages from
Member States that fail to implement Community directives.' The principle of
effectiveness is particularly interesting because, unlike other general principles of
law used by the ECJ, which are derived from a sense of the legal and constitutional
traditions of the Member States,'8 5 the principle of effectiveness has been created
almost exclusively from a judicially-derived understanding of the meaning and
effect of the Treaties themselves. 8 6 The ECJ's decision, in which the principle was
announced that an individual would have a claim for compensation against a
Member State for breach of Community law, 8 7 shows the court of the judge/priest
at its best. The ECJ starts with the principle that the Treaties created "[their] own
legal system, which is integrated into the legal systems of the Member States." '
This legal system binds not only Member States but individuals as well.8I 9 The
obligations imposed by this legal system must also create rights in individuals
arising "not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty but also by virtue
of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined manner both on
individuals and on the Member States and the Community institutions.""' The
(expounding on the development of the principle of equal treatment within the ECJ and its
application to sex and gender discrimination issues)).
183 See discussion supra note 157.
"a See Joined Cases C-46/93 & 48/93, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex
parteFactortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1 95. The application of this principle to create
a right of recovery in damages against Member States has generated a mountain of literature.
See, e.g., Diedre Curtin, The DecentralisedEnforcementof CommunityLaw Rights: Judicial
Snakes and Ladders, in CONsTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
NATIONAL LAW 33-49 (Diedre Curtin & David O'Keefe eds., 1992).
185 See, e.g., Case 25/68, Klomp v. Inspektie der Belastingie, 1969 E.C.R. 43, 50 (1969).

This does not mean that any particular principles of another legal order - even
those embodied in the constitutions of the Member States - are binding as such
on the Community organs. Rather, national principles simply offer authoritative

evidence of an existing consensus which the Court may draw for persuasive
support of its decisions.
EMILIOU, supra note 121, at 125.
186 See TRIDIMAS, supra note 127, at 276 (stating that the principle "derives from the

distinct characteristics of Community law, primary and direct effect. The origins of the
principle lie in the interpretative techniques of the Court.").
187 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy 1991
E.C.R. 1-5357
(1991), [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993).
.8 Id. at [30.

Id.
190 Id.
189

2003]

RETAINING JUDICIAL AuTHORiTY

general principle of effectiveness requires that the rights of individuals would be
impaired if individuals were unable to obtain compensation for breaches by
Member States of their Treaty obligations,'' and requires that national courts
ensure the full effect of rights and obligations.' 92 Individuals' rights are particularly
impaired in the context in which this case arose.' 93 "It follows that the principle
whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals by
breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent
in the system of the Treaty."' 94 The relationship between judge and text is made
clear. Text, clearly the supreme source of legitimacy in a system of civil law
sensibilities, becomes a vehicle through which judges can assert a singular

authority. "The response of the ECJ to the lack of legislation at Community level
[was] to create a system of harmonized judicial remedies for breach of Community
law, by intervening to bring about a more incremental judicial harmonization.""-'
From this relationship springs readings that reinforce the authority of the judge as
the exclusive and paramount reader of text at both the EU and national court levels.
Indeed, one of the bases of academic criticism of this system of judicial ownership
of the Treaties was the way in which it tended to include judges at all levels of the
EU - both EU and national courts - but excluded the other institutions of
96
government - legislatures and executives.
The same principle of effectiveness was the basis out of which the ECJ
constructed one of the most important European rights of individuals against the
Member States - the rule of the direct effect of directives.' 97 Here, miscausation
'9' Id. at q[33.
192 Id. at 32.
'9'

Id. at [ 34. The Court stated:
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly
indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community rules is
subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the
absence of such action individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the
rights conferred upon them by Community law.

Id.
194 Id. at

35.

195 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 132, at 252.
' Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions,
Processes, Tools and Techniques, 56 MOD. L. REV. 19, 51 (1993). Snyder comments:
By breathing new life into the form ofjudicial cooperation envisaged by Article 177
[now Art. 234], it strengthens the vertical relations of collaboration within the
judicial branch at two levels of government. However, it does not involve directly
any other national institutions such as parliaments. In addition, it does not
necessarily strengthen existing relations between Community institutions, nor does
it create new horizontal links between them.

Id.
"' See Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traustein, 1971 E.C.R. 825; Case 41/74, van
Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (1975).
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is particularly acute. The principle of direct effects had an obvious impact on the
power relationships between the institutions of the EU and the Member States. One
might have expected a greater resistance on the part of the national courts of the
Member States to this shifting of power up to the institutions of the EU. Instead,
the opposite occurred. Bruno de Witte recently suggested that the lack of resistance
should have come as no surprise. " The constitutional doctrines of the national
courts of most of the Member States, with respect to the EU Treaties, permitted the
courts to treat ECJ judgments (including that of direct effects) as definitive
interpretations of the intentions of the contracting parties to the Treaties, and on that
basis, applied domestically to the resolution of national cases, power over which the
nationalcourts did not lose as a result of the direct effects doctrine.'99
The process of miscausation through a jurisprudence of general principles
becomes clear - general principles, the mechanics of interpretation of text, is
deployed to find nontextual rules inherent in text itself. Interpretation permits
revision without amendment. The judge, servant of text, becomes text itself - it
is the European judge who has authority to see the language "inherent" (and thus
binding) within the text. The servant thus becomes master. "The fact that.., a rule
is not mentioned in written law is not sufficient proof that it does not exist."2 ' In
this respect, the justice of the European Court differs little from his counterparts on
the United States Supreme Court. There is no difference, in effect, between the
American common law jurisprudence of "originalism" and the European civil law
jurisprudence of interpretive general principles, though each is distinct and rooted
thoroughly in their unique derivative legal cultures. But the originalism that
constructed a principle of state sovereign immunity from the Eleventh Amendment
has little difference in effect from the general principles of law that produced state
liability to individuals for failure to transpose directives onto their national law.
What has been said about the justices of the ECJ can be applied in equal measure
to the justices of the United States Supreme Court.

' See Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order,in
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 177

199See id. at 195.

200

(Paul Craig & Grdinne de Btdrca eds., 1999).

Case 108/63, Merlini v. High Authority, 1965 E.C.R. 1, 10, [1965] C.M.L.R. 109

(1965). As Professor Tridimas notes:
The interpretive function of general principles acquires particular importance in
this context precisely because it is the only function which they may fulfill.
Where courts are called upon to interpret rules which they have no jurisdiction
to annul, interpretation becomes the primary means by which they can influence
the effectiveness of such rules. Interpretation in that context becomes particularly
instructive as the expression ofjudicial policy: it tells us what the court perceives
to be its function, what it considers to be the underpinnings of the legal system,
and how it prioritizes the rules of primary law of that system.
TRIDIMAS, supra note 127, at 33-34.
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For his part the judge identifies a common, unwritten principle: "the
general principle of the rights of the defence." Following a procedure
of extension by analogy he ensures its application in all individual
procedures well beyond the areas where the texts had enshrined them.
Accordingly, "respect for the rights of the defence in all proceedings
against a person liable to lead to an adverse act constitutes a fundamental
principle of Community law that must be ensured even in the absence of
any regulation concerning the procedure." This formula means that the
content of the guarantees is amplified, their field of application extended
and their effects reinforced.20'
Understood with a Nietzschean sensibility, the self-reinforcing potential of these
forms of judging become evident.
The German Federal Constitutional Court has likewise constructed, from out
of the German basic law, a fabric of principles that more and more closely tie the
basic law to the interpretive vision of the Federal Constitutional Court.2"2 Indeed,
some have noted the similar ways in which American and German jurists
function.203 But the similarity, the resort to interpretive techniques that rely on
miscausation for their effectiveness, follows more closely the form of the ECJ, than
of the United States Supreme Court.
In The Southwest State Case,2" the German Federal Constitutional Court used
a dispute about the reorganization of certain German Lander to articulate a theory
of the relationship between judge and text in German jurisprudence that would
ensure the predominance of the judiciary in the reading of (and even perhaps over)
the text of the German Basic Law. The court declared that constitutional provisions
can be understood only against the base line of principles derived from an
understanding of the Basic Law as a whole. 205 Application of those principles may
work to effectively nullify a constitutional provision that cannot be interpreted in

20'

Loc Azoulay, The Judge andthe Community's Administrative Governance, in GOOD

114 (Christian Joerges & Renaud
Dehousse eds., 2002).
202 For a discussion of the development of the German law of general constitutional
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET 109,

principles, see DONALD P.

KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 507 (2d ed. 1997); SABINE MICHALOWSKI AND LORNA
WOODS, GERMAN CONSTrTUTIONALLAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 7-50 (1999).
203 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLC OF GERMANY 215

(1994) ("But the fact is that in periods of real or imagined danger we have tended to adopt
measures strikingly similar in effect to those expressly countenanced by the Basic Law, and
the Supreme Court has tended to uphold them - in the teeth of an ostensibly absolute
constitutional protection.").
204 (1951) 1 BVerfGE 14, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 202, at 62.
205 Id.
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a manner compatible with those principles." 6 And, it is for the judges to name
these principles from their collective readings of the text, and to apply them to both
an interpretation of provision of the Basic Law, and to application of the Basic Law
to questions in the context of legal disputes. °7 The principles of democracy and
federalism were identified as having supraconstitutional effect.20 s
In the German case, we have evidence of the judge's power over text that is
arguably even broader than that asserted by the justices of the ECJ. In both cases,
the judge is bound by text; the judge serves the text as its faithful intermediary. The
tools of mediation have permittedjudges to assert an exclusive and superior relation
to text, and the power to read text extra-textually. The polity looks at text;
academics argue about the reasonableness of interpretation. Thus misfocused on
substance, neither polity nor academics see with much clarity the subterranean
reinforcement that such stances have for judicial power. For the judge, the
correctness of this or that interpretation is less significant than the reaffirmation of
the power of the judge to make the decision. In this respect, the text of European
constitutions can achieve the malleability of the American federal constitution. The
tools are different, the effect is the same - the judge is triumphant.
C. Is a Text Necessary for InterpretiveMiscausation?
I have been speaking of text. In the American common law context, even the
American constitutional common law context, that text is written. The same is true
in civil law and socialist states worldwide, from France and Germany, to China.
Theocratic priestly states certainly rely on the written text. Emerging international
206 id

The critical passage, now a fundamental part of German constitutional jurisprudence,
stated:
An individual constitutional provision cannot be considered as an isolated clause
and interpreted alone. A constitution has an inner unity, and the meaning of any
one part is linked to that of other provisions. Taken as a unit, a constitution
reflects certain overarching principles and fundamental decisions to which
individual provisions are subordinate .... Thus this court agrees with the
statement of the Bavarian Constitutional Court: "That a constitutional provision
itself may be null and void is not conceptually impossible just because it is a part
of the Constitution. There are constitutional principles that are so fundamental
and so much an expression of a law that has precedence even over the
Constitution that they also bind the framers of the Constitution, and other
constitutional provisions that do not rank so high may be null and void because
they contravene these principles." From this rule of interpretation, it follows that
any constitutional provision must be interpreted in such a way that it is
compatible with those elementary principles and with the basic decisions of the
framers of the Constitution.
Id. 2, at 63.
208 Id. (f 3-4, at 63-64.
207
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legal orders, such as the EU, also ground their foundations on written text. The
common assumption, since the middle of the last century, has been that
constitutions are written. 2 9 Reducing constitutional text to writing has a long
pedigree in the West, extending back to classical Greece"' and Rome.2 1
There are a number of conventional explanations for the value of written
constitutions. Most center on the notions of uniform memorialization, accessibility,
visibility, and availability.1 2 Indeed, the human rights components of modern
instruments make visibility among the most useful of the characteristics of written
constitutions . 213 And since the last century, at least, it has become almost
unthinkable to base the legal order of a political community on anything other than
a written instrument.
Yet, as we have seen, within a judicially ordered priestly state, a written
constitution can be as mysterious, as unavailable, as invisible, as Egyptian
hieroglyphics without a Rosetta Stone. 214 Traditionally in the West, the law has
been a subject of discussion among elites in languages reserved for the educated
who could not only read and write - any noble might be able do this - but do so
in a language other than the vernacular. In Europe, that language had been Latin.21
See, e.g., EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONSTITUTION-MAKING: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS,
PRACTnCE (1981); Donald P. Kommers, The Value of ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, 9 J.
209

MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRoc. 685 (1976); Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions,
Constitutionalism,andDemocracy,in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS
INTHE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
20 Aristotle was among the first scholars of constitutionalism in the

West. He based his

studies on the written constitutions of the Greek city-states. See, e.g., CHARLES HOWARD
MCILWAIN, CONSTrunITONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN (1940); SIR DAVID Ross,
ARISTOTLE (1995).
21 The Roman basic law -

the Twelve Tables -

was written down soon after the fall of

the monarchy. The act of writing was important for Romans; it served as a device to make
Roman basic norms more accessible to the populace - or rather to those citizens who
thereafter retained a monopoly over its deployment. For a discussion of Roman lawmaking
in this respect, see ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS (1970); ALAN
WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES: PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1975).
212 See, e.g., MCWHINNEY, supra note 209.
2.3 The German constitution provides an excellent, modem case-in-point: not only are the
first twenty articles of the German Basic Law a memorialization of a basic catalogue of
modem understandings of individual human and political rights, but the Basic Law itself
prohibits amendments of those provisions. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 1-20
(F.R.G.). In this sense, the human rights provisions of the German Basic Law acquire
"superconstitutional" status.
214 On the Rosetta Stone, see E.A. WALLIs BUDGE, THE ROSETrA STONE (1989). From my
perspective, of course, the judicial priest embodies that stone - a living stone within the
priestly state.
21' In Europe, after the rediscovery of the Corpus Iuris Civilis and the development of
legal study, Latin became the lingua franca of both canon and academic law. For a
discussion, see John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature,93
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Though law codes in England and on the continent of Europe had been translated
into the vernacular after the first millennium, 2 6 Latinisms and Anglo-Norman
French remained part of the language of the law in England and the United States
well into the twentieth century.2 17
Even when written in the vernacular, the written words of the law - and
especially the words in the written constitution - could be infused with special
meaning - with a unique construction which has little relation to popular
usage. The excuse, as Justice Marshall explained to Americans early in their
national history, is simple: "[I]t is a constitution we are expounding. 21 8 Within the
EU, the jurisprudence of interpretation leading to the constitutional doctrines of
direct effect2" 9 and equal treatment of the sexes 220 produced similar results.2"'
Text, as such, has served the judicial priest well, at least in the Nietzschean
sense. Recall that the point I make here is not whether the words of a text ought to
have one particular meaning or another, or whether common usage or a special
vocabulary ought to apply to the language of the way. Those questions serve
miscausation, invert cause and effect, by treating the symptom (the use of language)
rather than the disease (the contest over the power to ask, and answer, these
COLUM. L. REv. 547, 587 (1993) ("Latin had been the ordinary language of European law
into the seventeenth century.").
216 Thus, for example, Spanish law, Las Siete Partitasof Alfonso el Sabio (the Wise),
became renowned in Europe as among the first translations of the law from Latin to the
vernacular, with the purpose of making the letter of the law more accessible to those charged
with its enforcement. On the Siete Partitas,see DWAYNE E. CARPENTER, ALFONSO X AND
THE JEWS: AN EDITION OF AND COMMENTARY ON SIETE PARTIDAS 7.24 "DE LOS JUDIOS"
(1986).
217 See Alan J. Hartnick, The Use of Latin in Law Today, 66-Feb. N.Y. ST. B. J. 39, 39
(1994). As he explains it:
"LAW LATIN, or dog Latin, is the bastardized or debased Latin formerly used
in law and legal documents, from which we have for the most part escaped...
.".
"LAW FRENCH refers to the Norman-French dialect used in all legal
documents and judicial proceedings from the time of William the Conqueror to
the reign of Edward III, and used with frequency in legal literature up to the
seventeenth century. Though Law French may sound obscure to the Englishspeaking lawyer, its remnants abound in the language of the law, in common
words such as appeal, assault, arrest, counsel, demand, disclaimer, escheat,
escrow, heir, indictment, laches, lay, lien, merger, ouster, party, process, proof,
suit, tort, and verdict ..... "
218 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Of course, Justice
Marshall appeared to have something else in mind in the context from which this quotation
was taken. Yet even in context, the quotation is revealing of the need to establish the
supremacy of the judge over text, and text over government in the sense in which I use those
terms here.
219 See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 5.
220 See id.
221 See discussion supra Part II.
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questions about fundamental text). The recent jurisprudence over the meaning of
Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment,222 culminating in City
224
ofBoerne v. Flores,223 which struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
provides a recent example. On the one hand, City of Boerne can be read as a case
involving the appropriate interpretation of constitutional text. On the other hand,
City of Boerne illustrated the judge using text to discipline a political branch of
government seeking to assert an independent power over the meaning of text.225
Thus, the Nietzschean insight of the priest, as applied to the judge serving in the
same capacity, reveals these debates over language not as an ends - the search for
meaning - but as a means to power for the judge. The control of meaning
effectively reconstitutes thejudge. No longer merely the protector of the sovereign
authority of the people, as expressed in their written texts, the judge becomes
sovereign authority itself.
Yet, a constitution need not be written to produce this transfer of effective
sovereign authority to the priestlyjudge. The priestly relation between judge and
text is not limited to written text. An oral tradition will do as well. The priestly
office is as comfortable with oral tradition as with written text.226 The relation of
This section provides that "[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
223 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The thrust of City of Boerne was applied in Board of Trustees
of the Univ. ofAlabama v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356 (2001), in which the Supreme Court held
that Congress could not extend Title I of the American With Disabilities Act to the states.
224 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
225 In analyzing Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, William Araiza
has suggested a similar understanding:
On this view, RFRA's problem was that it used these legal terms [terms
developed and applied by the courts in matters of constitutional interpretation:
"substantial burden," "compelling governmental interest," and "least restrictive
means"] in an area subject to the courts' ultimate authority: the meaning of the
Constitution. The sequences of events leading to City of Boerne suggests the
problem. In Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause so as to subject
government action burdening religion to less stringent scrutiny than the
compelling government interest test that had prevailed since Sherbertv. Verner.
In RFRA, Congress sought to overturn Smith and reinstate a version of the
Sherberttest. In turn, City ofBoerne struck RFRA down as exceeding Congress'
power to "enforce" the free exercise guarantee.
William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: Section 5 ofthe FourteenthAmendment and the
Availability of DamagesAwards to Gay State Employees Under the ProposedEmployment
Non-DiscriminationAct, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 59 (2002).
226 Consider an expression of this comfort from the Catholic Catechism:
In keeping with the Lord's command, the Gospel was handed on in two ways:
- orally "by the apostles who handed on, by the spoken word of their
preaching, by the example they gave, by the institutions they established, what
they themselves had received - whether from the lips of Christ, from his way
222
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the judge to the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom provides a glimpse
of the Nietzschean possibilities forjudicial supremacy even in a regime of unwritten
constitutions and nominal Parliamentary supremacy.227
An unwritten constitutional text, like that of the U.K., 2 provides a greater
range of authority to the judge in his priestly role. In states without written
constitutions, the judge may not only acquire a monopoly over the authority to say
what the text means, she also acquires a monopoly over what the text says. In
effect, the judge, and the judge alone, can authoritatively read and interpret
constitutional text. The constraint of a written text, that might limit the interpretive
potential of the judicial priest in states with a written constitution, is absent here.
of life and his works, or whether they had learned it at the prompting of the Holy
Spirit";

- in writing "by those apostles and other men associated with the apostles
who, under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit, committed the message of
salvation to writing."
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

76, at 24-25 (1994).

Of course, British Parliamentary supremacy has been ceded, to a certain extent, to the
institutions of the EU after Britain acceded to the EU Treaties. Traditionally, U.K. courts
did not generally perform the same oversight of parliamentary law as American courts did.
There is no general notion of "unconstitutionality." However, as a member of the EU, and
a signatory of the Human Rights Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222), U.K. law has felt the tug of
the overarching quasi-constitutional principles of the EU Treaties. See, e.g., Regina v. Sec'y
of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame, Ltd., [1994] 1 A.C. 603 (1990) (holding the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1988, and regulations thereunder imposing restrictions on Spanish
fishing vessels, void as contrary to EU law); Equal Opportunities Comm'n v. Sec'y of State
for Employment, [1994] 1 All E.R. 910 (voiding provisions of the English Employment
Protection Act, making it more difficult for part-time workers to receive benefits than fulltime workers on the basis of EU directive); J.W. Bridge, The EuropeanCommunitiesandthe
CriminalLaw, 1976 CRIM. L. REV. 88 (1976) (exploring the relevance of the criminal law
to the European communities at present); Bernard Schwartz, Wade's Seventh Edition and
Recent EnglishAdministrative Law, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 175, 176-78 (1996).
28 Traditionally, the British constitution was said to be an amalgam of rules and
conventions that together comprised a "constitution." An early and authoritative description
227

is provided by A.V. Dicey:
"constitutional law," as the expression is used in England, both by the public and

by authoritative writers, consists of two elements. The one element, here called
the "law of the constitution," is a body of undoubted law; the other element, here
called the "conventions of the constitution," consists of maxims or practices
which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown, of Ministers, and
of other persons under the constitution, are not in strictness laws at all.
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxli (Liberty
Classics ed., 1982) (1915). For a modern gloss on the existence and components of a
constitution for the U.K., see NEILMACCORmICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE,
AND PRACTICAL REASON (1999); Rodney Brazier, The Constitutionof the UnitedKingdom,
58(1) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 96 (1999).
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Thus, consider the way in which U.K. courts have described and interpreted the
fundamental rights of individuals.229 The essence of that description and
interpretation involve the recollection, memory, and recasting of actions and texts
with constitutional significance: Runnymeade and the Magna Carta,230 the expulsion
of James II and the Act of Settlement,2 ' and other such critical events in the
construction of the English constitution. Event and text provide a legitimacy based
on past community - shared past action.232 The judge asserts authority by making
himself, and his caste, the unquestionable source of recollection of germinal events
and explanation of the legal or constitutional importance of each. The judge/priest,
in a sense, becomes memory itself. Thus, even the most conservative
pronouncement of the limits of the judicial office can suggest a broad effect.
Consider the caution of Francis Bacon:
Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus
dare; to interpret law, and not make law, or give law; else will it be like
the authority claimed by the Church of Rome, which, under pretext of
exposition of Scripture, doth not stick to add and alter, and to pronounce
that which they do not find, and, by show of antiquity, to introduce
novelty.233
229

The contrast which has been suggested between the difficulty of change in a
progressive direction under the British Constitution is borne out by a
consideration of the extent to which individual rights and liberties are guaranteed
by the Constitution. The absence of any special legal guarantee of rights as is
often to be found, although with greatly varying effectiveness, in other
constitutions, is a marked feature of the British political system. It is an
understanding of British government, rather than an enactment, that the
individual has freedom of expression, movement, association, and meeting, and
that he is not bound to belong to any religious sect.

H.R.G. GREAVES, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 21-22 (1955).
230 See J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1992).
231 The Act of Settlement is particularly interesting in this respect. Here, there exists a
contemporary account of a controversy over the nature of the creation of the fictions of
memory necessary to turn the expulsion of James II and the Act of Settlement into a
regularized constitutional principle. Blackstone's narrative of the constitutional foundations
of English constitutional law, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, based on the
creation of a host of legal fictions to regularize revolutionary events (particularly with respect
to the events of 1688) is described and criticized byJeremy Bentham. See JEREMY BENTHAM,

FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Cambridge University Press
1988) (1776).
232 In a sense, the relation betweenjudge and constitutional event is similar to that between
contemporary priest and Christ with his apostles. Cf. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
76 at 24-25 (1994) (preaching the Gospel through oral and written words of the Lord from
apostles).
233 FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS AND NEW ATLANTIS 225 (Walter J. Black, Inc., 1969)
(Classics Club ed.) (3d ed. 1625) (No. 59, Of Judicature).
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We can all agree that the Magna Carta was executed at Runnymeade. But only
the priestly judge can explain to us that this event had constitutional significance;
only the priestly judge can interpret the magnitude of the significance of that
constitutional event; and only the priestly judge can apply the principles of
constitutional significance derived from this event and text (Runnymeade and the
Magna Carta) to everyday life.
The priest in British society thus serves a critical stabilizing function by
formulating and infusing with meaning a string of historic events that become
important because of the meaning with which the are vested by the courts. So
vested, they are deemed adopted by the political community as self-evidently true.
Nietzschean miscausation stabilizes by furthering the fiction that what is believed
has been done, and what is written has been agreed. In a sense, the priest becomes
critical to the formation of constitutionalism where the text is unwritten. The priest
is the parasite that sits in the belly of the social order and digests social action.
Through acts of will and power (the decision), the priest regularizes the social order
as practiced, and thus stabilizes it against internal and external attack. By creating
an authority for the text, the priest invests herself with a like authority. Authority
is created by grounding accepted social practice (with respect to the rights of
individuals, the powers of the state or its institutions, etc.) outside of social practice.
Thus, the right to be heard acquires an authority, not because it reflects the practice
of the society from which it is derived, but because the priest reconstitutes the
practice as deriving instead from universal principles, natural law, or the necessary
fundamental ordering of society. What belongs to the human can be practiced by
human society only by reconstituting it as outside the human. Thus, Nietzschean
miscausation exists - resulting in the nexus of state stability and judicial
authority. 3

An objection, however, can be raised. It is unreasonable, the objection may go,
to suppose that a caste of people - judge or priest - can be vested with the sort
of authority necessary to induce society to accept this caste's version of how a text
reads, as well as accept this caste's interpretation of the text so read. How does the
judge/priest obtain the acquiescence of the herd with respect to the authority of the
unwritten constitution? The answer lies in the relationship between the symbolic
and theory. Shared memory of constitutional events, their reenactment, and the
theater of authority provide the symbolic vehicle for acceptance. Thus, investiture
of the judge, a symbolic touching, emphasizes the connection between the divine
234 Stability, of course, provides its own reward. By situating the constitutional, and even
the unwritten constitutional, outside human practice, the priest creates a barrier to its
modification. Once identified as constitutional, the practice is elevated and modification of
the practice becomes harder. By vesting the priest with the authority to read and interpret the
text of this now-constitutional practice, the people must find it more difficult to read, much
less interrogate, the text of the constitutional text announced by the judge.
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and the priest, or the connection between the law and the judge. Oath-taking,
anointing, and baptism all serve this purpose as well. The preservation of relics
provide a physical connection to the constitutional events.235 And the need to
discipline, to interpret, and to apply the constitutional norms provides a vehicle for
the reexpression of memory by the judge.236 Here, temptation and testing provide
contemporary connection in a way that echoes the utility of temptation and testing
within religion. 7
III. THE JUDIcIAL/PRIESmY STATE: THE VALUE OF ERROR TO A POLITICAL
COMMUNITY

Having attempted to expose the priestly drive to errors of causation, I do not
mean to suggest the need to mount an effort to find and eradicate such error - or
even to combat the type of the priest, as such - within our system. Nietzsche
shows us how, from the individual perspective, priest and error can be dangerous. 8
Consider, in this light, the importance to the American people of preserving the original
copies of the federal Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. One enters the
National Archives building in Washington, D.C. as if one were entering a temple or other
sacred space. Across the entry, framed in an elaborate housing reminiscent of the structures
used to house the Old Testament scrolls in Jewish houses of worship, sit the primary relics
of American socio-political organization. For a visual depiction, see United States National
Archives & Records Administration, http://www.archives.gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
Western society, no less than others around the globe, has a strong cultural attachment to
relics in the construction and maintenance of core normative beliefs. See, e.g., P. R. L.
BROWN, RELICS AND SOCIAL STATUS IN THE AGE OF GREGORY OF TOURS (1977); JOHN
235

BUTLER, THE QUEST FOR BECKET'S BONES: THE MYSTERY OF THE RELICS OF ST. THOMAS
BECKET OF CANTERBURY (1995); THOMAS E.A. DALE, RELICS, PRAYER, AND POLITCS IN
MEDIEVAL VENETIA: ROMANESQUE PAINTING INTHE CRYPT OFAQUILEIA CATHEDRAL (1997);
HERATH, DHARMARATNA, THE TOOTH RELIC AND THE CROWN (1994) (discussing the

interaction of religion and politics in ancient Sri Lanka).
236 The disciplining of the sexual conduct of men through sodomy and solicitation laws
provides a vivid exemplar of this need. See Larry Cati Backer, Tweaking Facts,Speaking
Judgment: Judicial Transmogrificationof Case Narrativeas Jurisprudencein the United
States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 611 (1998).

...For a taste of the general discussion of temptation in the study of religion, see

SIMCHA
BENYOSEF, THE LIGHT OF EPHRAIM: THE ASCENT FROM TEMPTATION TO DrVINE
CONSCIOUSNESS (2002); JEFFREY B. GIBSON, THE TEMPTATIONS OF JESUS IN EARLY

H.

CHRISTIANITY (1995).
238 In the relationship of Paul to law, Nietzsche describes the ultimate effect of the priestly
project on law at its limit:
Paul became the fanatical defender of this god and his law and guardian of his

honor; at the same time, in the struggle against the transgressors and doubters,

lying in wait for them, he became increasingly harsh and evilly disposed to them,
and inclined toward the most extreme punishments. And now he found that -

hot-headed, sensual, melancholy, malignant in his hatred as he was-he was
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Yet Nietzsche also confirms how priest and error can be of great value in the
deployment of institutions meant to control communities.13 9 The examples of the
priest among the People of Israel,'4 0 and the construction of Christianity by Paul,24'
suggest the utility and strength of the model. Legal nomocracy, like its religious
counterpart, can enhance democratic value, providing a meritocratic basis of sorts
for the operation of the state.242 In that sense, nomocracy both twists and enhances
the fundamental organizing principles of our Republic. In an ironic twist of
causation, I suggest that the priest did not usurp dominion over the herd. Instead,
the herd, for its own preservation, demanded the overlordship of the priest.
I offer here a tangible expression of Nietzschean irony as an indication of the
human social condition necessary to ensure the longevity of the authority of the
243
judge: The necessity of error.
himself unable to fulfill the law.... The tremendous consequences of this idea,
of this solution of the riddle [transgress the law by annihilating it], spin before
his eyes.., the destiny of the Jews - no, of all men - seems to him to be tied
to this idea ....[Flor he is from now on the teacher of the annihilationof the
law....

The Dawn, supra note 46, at 77, 79.
239 See The Antichrist, supra note 1, at 595-98.
240 Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 616-18.

241

Gidon Sapir notes that "the Jewish sages, those empowered to interpret and develop
the Jewish Law, may come - and indeed came - from various classes and not only from
the elite or any other special class. In such a nomocracy, certain aspects of democracy may
exist." Gidon Sapir, Religion and the State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and
ConstitutionalEntrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 617, 641 n.83 (1999).
242

The same, of course, has been true within the organizations of other Western religions Christianity and Islam. See ERNEST L. FORTIN, CLASSICAL CHRISTIANrY AND THE POLITICAL
ORDER: REFLECTIONS ON THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL PROBLEM (J. Brian Benestad ed.,
1996); TILMAN NAGEL, THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: FROM MUHAMMAD TO THE

(Thomas Thornton trans., 2000).
In the United States, the great parallel to this leveling social quality of nomocracy has

PRESENT

been within the law. The apocryphal story of Abraham Lincoln remains a powerful cultural
signifier. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, LINCOLN'S VIRTUES: AN ETHICAL BIOGRAPHY (2002).

The stories of the justices of the Supreme Court are also full of rags-to-riches stories. See
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS

(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). The power of the law as a class leveler is
certainly evidenced by the great efforts of elite elements within legal academia and the bar
to limit the opportunities of the poor, immigrants, and people of color during much of the
twentieth century. For a history of those efforts, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE INMODERN AMERICA 102-57 (1976) (containing
chapters appropriately entitled "Cleansing the Bar" and "Babbitry at the Bar").
243 Soren Kierkegaard, in his study of the concept of irony, noted that:
Tallyrand's famous statement that man did not acquire speech in order to reveal
his thoughts but in order to conceal them contains a profound irony about the
world and from the angle of political prudence corresponds entirely to another

2003]

RETAINING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Nietzsche provides a useful insight, a necessary inversion, of our understanding
of the judicial project. Judges work hard to create a form of law making, an
engagement with law, that furthers the necessity forjudicial engagement. Nietzsche
also hints at the allure of such inversion. Those who seek out judges are eager to
invest the judge with authority. The errors of causation in reverse, of the
construction of false or imaginary causes, can be applied to the judicial project
itself. Viewed from the perspective of the judge/priest, the basis of the judge's job
appears to be the preservation of the judge's job. The task of judging well, then, in
part depends upon the ability of the judge to preserve, for the judiciary, the task of
judging. Everything else is, for the judge, to some extent incidental. The Christian,
Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish manner of interpretation, of approaching the text in
accordance with an interpretive tradition of one or another cadre of communities of
priests so lovingly described by American commentators today," constitutes mere
patina. Scholars have paid a great amount of attention to what constitutes only the
overlayment (the form) through which the priestly tasks are accomplished in law.
That sort of attention leaves undisturbed any consideration of the purposes for this
overlayment, and its effect on the constitution of law, lawyers, and the courts.
Nietzsche's exploration of the psychology and the philosophy of the priest helps in
an understanding of the construction of judicial tasks from the perspective of the
priest, herself, as elaborate forms of self-preservation, effected through a variety of
forms in the United States and within the EU, but ultimately producing the same
result in different form.
Joseph Vining reminds us that "law connects language to person, and person to
action, through a form of thought that is not reducible to any other. The legal form
of thought is not waning - rather the reverse."245 Walter Kaufmann, very early in
his basic study of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, notes that "Nietzsche
became a myth even before he died in 1900, and today his ideas are overgrown and
obscured by rank fiction."246 Today Nietzsche continues to serve as fetish and
bogeyman for the American courts. He is an apostle of "ruthlessness and
'
barbarism."247
Nietzsche is served up as the Anti-Christ in the American world of
divinely inspired "rule of law."
Yet, it seems that Nietzsche does provide a more human way of understanding
the judicial project in the United States and Europe. Judge - like priest confounds cause and effect, develops a system of false and imaginary causes, and
genuinely diplomatic principle: mundus vult decipi, decipiaturergo [the world
wants to be deceived; therefore let it be deceived].
SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONcEPr OF IRONY

253-54 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong

eds. & trans., 1989) (1841).
244 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
245

JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP

246

KAUFMANN, supra note

247

Id. at 8.

30,

at 3.

357 (1995).
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perpetuates the idea of a free will, grounded on the judicial will. It is not the
imperial, but the priestly judiciary that lives, and that has lived since the time of
John Marshall. Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Mormon or Jew - the path of the
priestly is all the same. All that is required for the supremacy of the cult of the
priest is the elevation of the surface realities of the priestly cult, and the substitution
of those realities for that of its substance. A necessary amnesia is cultivated, as well
as the continued opaqueness of what lies below. The judges themselves have
thoroughly internalized the notion of judiciary as protector - as the primary
guardians of the democratic state. 48 James Bradley Thayer's fears may well
become a reality.249
Public law litigation has fundamentally transformed the judiciary from a
marginal to a central player in the American political process. 2 0 The success of this
system has not gone unnoticed. The law of the judge forms a core of the legal
structure of most modern democratic regimes. 251 The public law of the judge has
become well established even in civil law states traditionally suspicious of the
2

judge.

25

The judges of the U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, demonstrate well the way
judges play the role of Nietzsche's Paul within the religion of American
constitutionalism. American constitutionalism, like American religion, functions
248 See Race, "The Race," and the Republic, supra note 73.
249 Thayer warned that increased reliance on the judiciary for definitive

determinations of
the constitutional permissibility of legislative and executive action at all levels of government
could threaten the foundations of the state:
The people, all this while, become careless as to whom they send to the
legislature; too often they cheerfully vote for men whom they would not trust
with an important private affair, and when these unfit persons are found to pass
foolish and bad laws, and the courts step in and disregard them, the people are
glad that these few wiser gentlemen on the bench are so ready to protect them
against their more immediate representatives.
THAYER, supra note 14, at 104.
250 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARv.
L. REv. 1281 (1976); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition:School Desegregationand the
Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 751 (1986); Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools &
Prophets: Justice As Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1995).
251 See, e.g., Forward:Constitutional"Refolution" in the Ex-communist World: The Rule
of Law September 26, 1996, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 45 (1997); Jefferey M. Sellers,
Litigationas a Local PoliticalResource: Courts in Controversiesover Land Use in France,
Germany and the United States, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 475 (1995) (discussing the rise of

juridification in Europe).
252 In France, "[tihe most striking characteristic of the Conseil Constitutionnel has been

the rapid ascent of its political influence and prestige." F.L. Morton, JudicialReview in
France:A ComparativeAnalysis, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (1988); see also Cynthia Vroom,
ConstitutionalProtection of Individual Liberties in France: The Conseil Constitutionnel
Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REv. 265 (1988).
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on the basis of sin, of error. "[Tihe priest rules through the invention of sin[;]" 253
the constitutional judge rules through the inversion of doctrine. As Nietzsche
reminds us, "[djisobedience of God, that is, of the priest, of 'the Law,' is now called
'sin'; the means for 'reconciliation with God' are, as is meet, means that merely
guarantee still more thorough submission to the priest: the priest alone
'redeems."' 254 As the communities of the world construct forms of ever-wider
unions based on the form of the priestly state 5 - that is of the judicial state- the
understanding of the ways in which judges approach their task, and its effect on the
meaning and deployment of law, becomes ever more important.
But here again is the irony - another facet of the Nietzschean joke
encapsulated by the judge. As a means of social control, for the ordering of an
otherwise unruly democratic republic which means to remain democratic, there is
probably no better way than that of the priest. It was not Hans Kelsen,256 or
Alexander Hamilton,257 but Maximilien Robespierre, a father of unchecked state
sponsored terror, who argued that "ce mot dejurisprudencedes tribunauxdoit 9tre
'
A system grounded on a tolerance of the priestly model
effaci de notre langue."258
of judging - whether by the ordinary judiciary or specialized constitutional
The Antichrist,supra note 1, at 63 1.
Id. at 597-98.
Consider the standard model for regional trade associations, and even the World Trade
Organization, based on the concession of the power to resolve disputes to judicial, or quasijudicial, bodies. The effect, the creation of pyramids ofjudges operating at ever greater levels
of generality, has created the skeleton for a complex and interdependent worldwide priestly
state. For some of the ramifications of this supra-nation building on the authority of the
American courts, see Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational
Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000).
256 Hans Kelson, one of the greatest European legal thinkers of the twentieth century, had
designed the Austrian Constitutional Court after the First World War to which he had been
appointed in 1921. See David Kennedy, The InternationalStyle in PostwarLaw and Policy,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 30 (1994). For an introduction to his thought, see for example HANS
253
254
255

KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

(1945).

.57Alexander Hamilton was one of the great first defenders of the judiciary as an
important element of a balanced federal government. See THEFEDERALISTNO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
25" Maximilien Robespierre, Address at the Assembl6e Constituante (Nov. 18, 1790)
quoted in EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 75 (2002). The English translation is:
"Jurisprudence of courts is a word that should be effaced from our language."
The word "terrorism" was first coined in connection with the Jacobin "Reign of Terror,"
a period of the bloody French Revolution in which the French state, under the control of
Robespierre, executed approximately 17,000 presumed enemies of the state." See Scott M.
Malzahn, Note, State Sponsorship and Support of InternationalTerrorism: Customary
Norms of State Responsibility, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 83, 86 (2002).
Robespierre was a leading member of the Committee of Public Safety which, in 1793-1794
presided over the Reign of Terror in Revolutionary France. For an older, provocative
account, see NORMAN
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(1974).
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tribunals - perpetuates that diffusion of power which serves as an effective means
of avoiding tyranny.
Alexander Hamilton went too far, perhaps, in characterizing the judicial branch
as the least dangerous branch of government. 5 The judiciary - if unchecked is a dangerous branch, indeed. But, in its own way, the judge strives toward the
creation of a system of self-perpetuation and aggrandizement every bit as powerful
as those available to the legislator or to the executive. In a democratic polity, a
polity in which every institution of power tends towards its limit, the cultivation of
error as a means to judicial power provides a necessary indeterminacy in the locus
of power within the institutions of government. A herd with many masters may
well optimize the democratic potential of communal political organization.

259 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

